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Interoperability is defined as: 
The ability of systems, units or forces to provide data, information, 
materiel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units, or 
forces and to use the data, information, materiel, and services so 
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. IT 
interoperability includes both the technical exchange of information and 
the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange of information 
as required for mission accomplishment. [DODD02, 13] 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate some of the reasons why Command 
and Control Systems interoperability is so difficult to achieve and to offer both short term 
and long-term solutions.  The military has focused on interoperability via mandated 
technical architectures while ignoring the fact that the logic embedded in system software 
is the primary source of roadblocks to system interoperability.  For the DoD, it is simpler 
to focus on technical standards than to get any of the various services or subspecialties to 
agree on exactly what each C2 system should do.  Due to its unique nature as “Soldiers 
from the Sea,” the Corps interfaces directly with each service, and often buys its systems 
from the various services.  It therefore bears the brunt of many inter-service 
interoperability problems.  This thesis will focus on the interoperability requirements for 
two current Marine Corps ground command and control systems, the Intelligence-
Operations Server (IOS), and the Advanced Field Artillery Control System (AFATDS).   
 
B. BACKGROUND 
In keeping with the American tendency to always seek a better way to do 
something, the Department of Defense has continually sought to better control its forces 
through the use of computer and other technologies.  The intended benefits of automated 
control were the ability to control larger forces over a wider area, gain more and better 
intelligence, and speed decision-making.  One early example of military automation was 
the use of the ENIAC computer to calculate firing tables for the field artillery during the 
Second World War.  However, then as now there were significant social and cultural 
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barriers between military and the computer developers.  Because of these barriers the 
military focused on physical hardware characteristics, while the logical and software 
designs were left to the white coated people - others with more interest in these areas.  
Further, the military was often balkanized along services and functional specialties, and 
regularly failed to coordinate parallel weapons development and acquisition.  In the 
automated Command and Control arena, the result is a hodgepodge of incompatible 
hardware and software solutions.  Some systems effectively manage a particular function 
of C2, while others serve as bad examples of wasted funds and overblown expectations.  
Although the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is a successful replacement 
for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS) at the strategic 
and operational level of war, there is currently no integrated C2 solution for the tactical 
warfighter.    
The Corps focuses on winning battles and making Marines (i.e., instilling Marine 
Corps values into recruits) and generally operates at the operational and tactical levels of 
warfare.  The Marine Corps rightfully prides itself on its long and illustrious history of 
combat success.  As the smallest service in the DoD, it has traditionally been concerned 
with its own funding and survival.  To these ends, it has justified itself to the American 
people by being the best at every assigned mission.  Although the Marine Corps is 
innovative (for example, it developed effective amphibious tactics well before World 
War II required them), the Corps relies on tried and true methods and equipment.  The 
Corps doesn’t have a lot of patience for ineffective or complicated systems.  Only in the 
last few years have Marines started to realize the potential benefits of reliable, deployable 
Command and Control Systems.   
Finally, the Corps traditionally is an equipment buyer, rather than an equipment 
developer.  The Corps does not have large research and development budgets, and what 
budget the Corps does have is spent on developing transformational technologies such as 
the MV-22 and the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAAV). The Corps allows 
the other services to develop equipment as a risk-mitigation strategy.  The other service 
assumes the brunt of developmental costs and failure risk, while the Corps buys the 
resulting equipment.  Examples of this strategy abound, and include everything from the 
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M-16 to the F-18.  The result is that some Marine-specific requirements often are left out 
of new products, because the Corps bought the equipment off the “government shelf.”   
Despite these impediments, the Corps has a significant need for effective ground 
C2 systems.  The benefits of automated C2 are primarily in speedier decision-making and 
greater span of control.  The Corps needs innovative solutions to C2, and it needs to be 
able to interoperate with other joint and coalition forces.  The ultimate goal of Marine C2 
is to better accomplish the Marine warfighting mission while limiting resource use and 
minimizing casualties.    
The Marine Corps Systems Command (the organization responsible for 
development and acquisition of Marine Corps systems and equipment) has no less than 
30 different Command and Control Systems under development.  The Ground C2 
directorate has seven of these programs under its cognizance, of which two are the IOS 
and AFATDS.  IOS manipulates and displays the Common Operational Picture (COP), 
while AFATDS manages fire support.  Both these systems are in wide use in the Marine 
Corps today.  The lack of interoperability between these two systems is a critical issue 
because discrepancies between the two systems contribute to lack of trust in the 
information presented to the Commander and degrade the utility of both systems.   
    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research addresses the following primary questions:   
1. What are the logical underpinnings of AFATDS and IOS?   
2. What are the software interoperability requirements between these two 
systems? 
3. What near-term solutions are there to the interoperability problem? 




Interoperability and integration are recognized both inside and outside DoD as 
critical issues.  Because of this, there is a significant body of literature and great interest 
in the topic.   This thesis will narrow the topic by focusing on the logical (high level or 
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system level) interoperability and integration issues between theses two C2 Systems. 
Further, it will focus on the two primary tasks of maintaining the Common Operational 
Picture (COP), and calling for fire support.  Interesting requirements are requirements 
about items that help build the COP, such as unit information, position-location 
information, fire mission data, and Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.  
Uninteresting requirements are for peripheral and supporting data, formatting data, and 
textual messages.  Also, although there are significant interoperability issues at the 
hardware and joint technical architecture levels (i.e., do all systems work together on an 
Ethernet LAN or use compatible protocols), these issues are not covered in this thesis.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Methodology 
The research methodology consisted of literature reviews of both government and 
commercial industry documents, personal interviews with program managers, contractors 
and users, and visits to operating units, testers, and developers.  Financial support and 
extensive research material was received from the AFATDS Program Office, Marine 
Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.   
In order to better understand the specific interoperability problems, a trip was 
taken to 29 Palms, California to observe Combined Arms Exercise CAX 3 and 4, 2002.  
The unit undergoing training at these exercises was MAGTF-6, under the leadership of 
Colonel John Coleman, Commanding Officer of 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine 
Division.  During the period of his command, Colonel Coleman took a proactive 
approach to the use of digitized C2, and developed techniques and procedures to 
effectively use currently fielded systems.  His primary focus has been on the effective use 
of the COP at the Regiment and below.  
The second field trip was taken to the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support 
Activity (MCTSSA), Camp Pendleton, California, to observe IOS/AFATDS 
interoperability testing.  This testing was conducted from 25 Feb – 1 Mar 2002 in 
response to a message from the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) Fires Section, 
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indicating serious operational deficiencies and possible fratricide issues in the interface 
between these two systems. [1MEF02] 
 
2. Interoperability Analysis Methodology 
Joint and Marine Corps Command and Control doctrine is used as justification of 
interoperability requirements.  C2 Systems are complicated.  Both systems under study 
were developed for different customers using differing requirements and under widely 
differing conditions.  Any comparative study of both systems using the requirements 
development method from one system would be automatically biased against the other.  
For this reason, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) was chosen to model the 
significant aspects of both systems.  UML provides a common visual language for 
representing software systems.   
Interoperability requirements and recommendations will be presented in the 
context of the Levels of Information System Interoperability – Interoperability Maturity 
Model (LISI-IMM). [LISI98]  This model succinctly states the requirements for complete 
system interoperability, and provides a five-point scale for objectively evaluating current 
systems interoperability.  Although there is much discussion about the effectiveness of 
the automated tools used to evaluate Programs of Record under the model, the model’s 
conceptual framework is sound.   
 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, which are organized as follows:   
Chapter II introduces the concepts of Command and Control and outlines Marine 
Command and Control doctrine.  It outlines some of the arguments for and against C2 
automation.  This doctrinal underpinning justifies the requirements for automated 
command and control.   
Chapter III introduces the basic concepts of object orientation and describes 
pertinent features of the Unified Modeling Language.  Justification is provided as to why 
UML and object orientation is appropriate for this interoperability discussion.    
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Chapter IV describes the Intelligence-Operations Server.  It outlines the history of 
the system, analyzes system and interoperability requirements, and describes pertinent 
current system capabilities. 
Chapter V describes the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.  It 
outlines the history of fires automation and the genesis of the system, analyzes system 
and interoperability requirements, and describes pertinent current system capabilities.      
Chapter VI is an analysis of the interoperability needs of these two systems in 
light of the warfighter’s need for effective command and control. 
Chapter VII discusses current initiatives that various organizations are taking to 
increase the interoperability of these two systems.   
Chapter VIII lists the conclusions and recommendations of the study.   
 
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The primary benefit of this study is a better understanding of the challenges 
facing the Marine Corps in the acquisition, integration, and use of disparate Command 
and Control systems.  Due to its size and primary warfighting focus, the Marine Corps is 
in the position of system buyer, rather than system developer. Furthermore, due to the 
unique nature of Marines as “Soldiers of the Sea,” the Marine Corps is on the leading 
edge of inter-service interaction.  In the Command and Control domain, this interaction 
typically plays out in serious interoperability disconnects between joint systems while the 
Marines are performing real-world missions.  Therefore, it is imperative that the Marine 
Corps accurately and forcefully articulate its requirements for interoperability to the DoD 
and other services while they are building the systems the Marines will someday use.   
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II. MARINE CORPS AUTOMATED TACTICAL COMMAND AND 
CONTROL 
A. WHAT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)? 
The joint definition of Command and Control (C2) states:  
Command and Control is the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission.  Command and Control functions are 
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of the mission. [JPUB01, 89] 
Effective C2 is the critical element in the success of every military mission.  C2 is 
a process.  Computer systems designers must understand this process prior to system 
design.  C2 doctrine forms the basis of all C2 system requirements and merits further 
study.   
    
1. Nature of C2  
The Marine Corps considers C2 to be “the means by which a commander 
recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.” 
[MCDP06]  From this simple definition one can see that C2 frames every decision the 
military takes.  Command and Control is a pervasive process rather than one among a set 
of warfare specialties.  C2 is also highly personality-dependent, as it is the commander 
who exercises C2.  C2 is not assumed but rather C2 is assigned by proper authority.  
Command and control has two components.   
The first component, Command, is the exercise of properly assigned authority 
over designated forces.  It is seen as flowing from the commander to the commanded 
forces.    Command is the use of the commander’s will to carry out tasks.  Command may 
be limited by statute, mission, or situation.  The second element, control is generally seen 
as representing the methods that the commander takes to enforce command.  However, 
the Marine Corps takes the view that control serves as feedback to the commander, 
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carrying information about the command function. [MCDP06, 41] In either case, both 
command and control are descriptions of social interaction.  While the joint definition of 
C2 mentions the five components of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures, the Marine Corps reduces these items to the three “Pillars of Command 
and Control.”  These pillars are: people, information, and support.   
 
2. People 
The first pillar of C2 is people.  Commanders are people commanding other 
people who may themselves be commanders. Modern warfare precludes the commander 
from personally observing everything on the battlefield, and therefore people provide 
information to the commander.  Further, the commander is unable to personally control 
all assigned forces, and so people (staff and other commanders) help the commander 
make decisions and take action.  The measure of the size of forces a Commander can 
manage is called “Span of Control.”  Automation increases the Span of Control.  
 As an action of people, command is inseparable from leadership.  The art of 
leadership is the art of people making decisions.  People, not computers, make decisions.  
Marine Corps doctrine represents the process of coming to a decision using John Boyd’s 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act  (OODA) loop (Figure 1). As shown in the figure, this loop 
is a continuous cycle.  First, the commander must observe his environment and internal 
situation.  Then the commander orients on the militarily important aspects of the 
situation.  Using a formal decision-making process, his own intuition, or a combination, 
he comes to a point of decision.  He then acts on that decision in order to defeat the 
adversary.  The mechanics of the loop may also be applied to military organizations.     It 
is generally accepted that the side that more quickly executes the loop will have the 
advantage in any conflict.  The promise of automation is that the OODA Loop can be 
executed exponentially faster than manual methods for large Spans of Control.  Because 
Command and Control is a function of people, Marines are wary of systems that try to 
remove decisionmakers from the Command and Control process.   
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Figure 1.   The OODA Loop (From [MCDP06, 64]) 
 
Organization and training are two final aspects of people worth mention.  People 
are organized by the commander to meet the mission.  A poor organization will slow the 
collection of information, complicate the decision-making process, and take insufficient 
or inappropriate action.  The commander therefore sets the organization and trains his 




The second pillar of C2 is information.  Information is generally considered in 
terms of an information hierarchy.  The Marine Corps uses the hierarchy shown in Figure 
2 below.  Each level up in the hierarchy requires processing effort and filtering.  In this 
hierarchy, understanding is the highest rung, and occurs in the minds of people after the 
processing of information with their own judgment.  Data is the lowest rung in the 
hierarchy.  Without processing, data is useless.  Instead, data appropriate to the situation 
must be collected, analyzed, fused with other data.  Processed data must be analyzed to 
produce knowledge.  Then this knowledge must be formatted and presented to the 
commander in a timely manner in order to be militarily useful.  Because of the sea of data 
available, the commander risks information overload.  Therefore he must focus his 
intelligence (“data”) gathering processes to collect only critical information.  The 
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR’s) are an educated guess on 
what will be the information most relevant to making appropriate decisions, given the 
current situation.   
 
Figure 2.   The Information Hierarchy (From [MCDP06, 67]) 
 
As with people and the OODA loop, the information hierarchy benefits from 
functional, reliable automation.  Information in the military is time-critical, as 
information feeds the OODA loop.  Information must be available when the commander 
needs it.  The manner in which information is presented is also critical to absorption.  
Most people are more responsive to pictures than text.  Automated systems must 
therefore be able to present the complexities of the military situation pictorially and 
graphically.   
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In conflict, information needs are never completely filled.  Because the 
warfighting environment is so chaotic, a certain level of information deficit must be 
accepted.  Many times, the requirement to decide and act swiftly and forcefully 
outweighs the requirement for more information.  Therefore, automated C2 systems must 
focus on satisfying requirements over maximizing requirements.  Automated systems 
must add value to the commander despite an atmosphere of incomplete or partially 
inaccurate information.   
 
4. Support 
The final element of Command and Control is support.  Support includes items 
listed in the Joint definition of C2: the equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures.  Support includes all those things that compose an automated system, 
including the communications network, specialized hardware, and software.  Support 
always has been an element of C2 – an example from the Civil War era is the use of the 
telegraph to speed C2 functions.  The telegraph was an element of information grid of the 
Civil War Era.   
Marine doctrine emphasizes that people and information are much more important 
than any element of support.  This emphasis is added to ensure that technological 
wizardry never takes the place of the commander’s decision-making authority.  There is 
really no concern in the case of procedures – the Corps controls procedures.  However, 
“technology” is another matter. The Corps views talk from other services of hi-tech 
decision-making systems with skepticism.  The Corps also rejects technology that permits 
micromanagement of tactical commanders.  Instead, the Corps emphasizes that 
technology should enhance performance while allowing freedom of action for the 
commander.  Technology may reduce the number of people that are in the organizational 
chain, but Marines are wary of decisions made by Command and Control systems.  This 




 5. What Makes Effective C2 
a. Command 
Command is effective when the commander’s intent is clearly stated.  The 
commander’s intent is a short statement on why a particular action is being taken and 
what the desired end state of the action is.  In a rapidly changing situation or the absence 
of communications as may occur from time to time in war, a clear commander’s intent 
allows for independent action of subordinates to achieve the common goal.   
Command is effective when all parts of the military community plan 
collaboratively with a single goal in mind.  This single goal is referred to as the “single 
battle.”  Once the single battle is agreed upon, the various parts of the military can plan 
with a minimum of confusion and friction.  The modern military is a complicated system, 
and lack of cohesion can result in fratricide, confusion, and even mission failure.  
Command requires unhindered communication both up and down the 
chain of command.  Communication is the sending and receipt of messages.  Both the 
message processing and the content must be standardized between parties.  For spoken 
communication between the services, this clarity starts with an agreed-upon language.  
The Joint Dictionary of Terms [JPUB01] provides that common language to the 
warfighter.   Other agreed-upon standards provide the equivalent support for automated 
systems.   
Command requires the appropriate level of supervision to ensure that the 
commander’s intent is carried out to completion.  As previously mentioned, the Corps is 
concerned about technology being misused as an enabler for micromanagment.  
However, an appropriate level of supervision must be supported by automated systems, 
and it is incumbent upon leaders to focus on their responsibilities, even when an 




In Marine doctrine, control is represented as feedback from lower 
echelons to the commander.  [MCDP06, 40-41]  The commander therefore receives 
control from the force.  Taken in this light, effective control means the Commander 
receives critical information in time to make an appropriate decision (i.e., a decision as 
nearly correct as possible given the situation).  Control implies robust duplex (two-way) 
communication.  Control requires low latency.  Control requires accuracy.  Finally, 
control includes those actions taken to support the commander’s decision-making 
process.   
 
B. C2 AT THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR 
 
1. DoD Strategic and Operational Processes 
As a result of several serious operational deficiencies in the Department of 
Defense during and prior to the 1980’s, the Department of Defense was reorganized in 
1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols act.  The intent of this legislation was to force the U.S. 
military to fight jointly.  The benefits of fighting jointly are less interservice rivalry, 
reduction in force duplication, clarified service roles, a streamlined joint command 
structure, better advice for the president and civilian authorities, reduced costs, and fewer 
casualties from internal friction.  The performance of the DoD in Desert Storm served to 
validate the concepts embodied in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.   This legislation 
has had lasting positive effects on each service and the Department of Defense, and is 
considered a success.   
The Marine Corps and deployed Marine units generally are employed at the 
tactical and operational levels of war, although actions taken at this level of warfare can 
have strategic as well as tactical and operational consequences.  Marine forces are 
integrated under the Unified Commands with the other services in accordance with the 
Unified Campaign Plan (UCP).  The UCP divides the globe into regions and assigns 
responsibility for military affairs to Unified Commanders in each region.  An example 
regional command is the United European Command (EUCOM), which is responsible for 
American military forces in Europe and surrounding areas.  There are presently 6 Unified 
Combatant Regional Commands, including the new Northern Command. 
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The DoD has standardized its planning and warfighting processes to meet the 
requirements of joint, global action.  The primary process the Joint community uses is the 
Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).  JOPES is an agreed upon 
language and a standardized set of processes, supported by common automated systems. 
[JJPS95, i]  Primary JOPES products are campaign plans and force deployment 
information.  This critical planning function allows the military to prepare for 
contingencies.  JOPES processes can be used deliberately or in response to a crisis.  
JOPES products (the Operations Plans (OPLANS) and force deployment data (TPFDD)) 
are information intensive. 
 
2. Systems 
The JOPES process was first supported by the World-Wide Military Command 
and Control System (WMCCS).  The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) 
replaced WMCCS in the mid-1990’s.  GCCS incorporates the core planning and 
assessment tools required by the joint community to meet the information requirements 
of the services.  GCCS is composed of several mission applications (called the Unified 
Build) built on a single Common Operating Environment (COE).  GCCS is designed for 
networking.  GCCS maintains the Common Operational Picture (COP) for the President 
of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Unified Commanders.  GCCS 
primarily serves the strategic and operational levels of war.   
Because the modern military fights jointly and often with coalitions, Command 
and Control systems at all levels have much greater demands for interoperability than 
would be expected for systems that just support the services.   Further, C2 systems must 
be able to operate across service, distance, and jurisdictional boundaries.  As a practical 










C. FACTORS AFFECTING TACTICAL C2 
 
1. USMC Maneuver Warfare Doctrine 
The Marine Corps has adopted “Maneuver Warfare” for its fighting doctrine.  The 
alternate choice is “Attrition Warfare.”  Attrition Warfare defeats the enemy by head-to-
head engagement with the opposition.  In these engagements, the enemy is reduced by 
whatever means available, usually with the overwhelming application of combined arms.  
The primary focus often is reduction of the adversary’s military force. Attrition warfare is 
characterized by the extensive use of fires to reduce the enemy in frontal assaults.  The 
command structure for Attrition Warfare can be rigidly hierarchical, because what 
matters is the ratio of friendly to enemy combat power.  Since Attrition Warfare masses 
combat power, lower levels of leadership are within the senior commander’s span of 
control, and may have little decision-making authority. 
Maneuver warfare, on the other hand, endeavors to find the enemy’s weaknesses 
and exploit these weaknesses to bring about the desired end state.  These weaknesses may 
not be associated with the enemy’s combat power.  Maneuver warfare may require the 
application of overwhelming combat power, but the combat power is applied to the 
selected weaknesses.  The weaknesses that Maneuver Warfare focuses on are those that 
will bring the conflict to an end with a minimum of effort and casualties.  These 
weaknesses are known as “Critical Vulnerabilities.”  Maneuver Warfare requires more 
independent action on the part of subordinate leaders, because the senior commander may 
not know where all the enemy’s Critical Vulnerabilities are.  Instead, the senior 
commander issues a mission-type order with his intent clearly stated, and expects his 
subordinates to act with judgment in order to meet the commander’s intent.   
As a practical matter, automated C2 systems used to support Maneuver Warfare 
must support C2 decision-making at both higher and lower levels, while being able to 
present the same information to each level.  Automated systems must facilitate 
information passing between each level of command while being robust enough to 
maintain the last known information if communications are lost between units.    
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2. Implications of Combined Arms Concepts for C2 
Both attrition warfare and maneuver warfare require the use of “combined arms.”  
Combined Arms is the application of two or more warfighting techniques together in time 
and space on the enemy.  Generally, combined arms uses a direct-fire method and an 
indirect fire method.  As an example, consider an enemy defensive position.  A combined 
arms attack could have tanks firing at the position while aircraft drop bombs on it.  The 
adversary cannot respond to the tank fire without exposing himself to the effects of the 
aircraft, and cannot respond to the aircraft without exposing himself to the effects of the 
tank fire.  The critical elements to making combined arms effective are the effectiveness 
of each individual arm, and the combination of them in time and space.  Ensuring that 
each arm does not affect the other (i.e., avoiding fratricide) is called deconfliction. 
The implications of combined arms for C2 systems are complex.  First, C2 
systems must be able to share information across platforms.  C2 systems must be able to 
share information between the various warfighting communities with a common 
electronic data dictionary.  In the example above, the aircraft must be able to 
communicate with the tank commander.  The tank commander must know aircraft-
specific terms, and the pilot must know all about ground terms.  In order to assist with the 
deconfliction problem, C2 systems must know the physical effects of the ordnance being 
used.  The C2 systems must be on common time and share common geo-spatial data.    
The C2 system must be able to operate in a time-constrained environment.    
   
3. Effects of Weapons Technology on C2 
As weapons have gotten more lethal, friendly force dispersion has grown.  Greater 
dispersion means C2 systems must communicate across greater distances.  A continuing 
problem with current C2 systems is their inability to communicate the required amount of 
information across empty space, when both senders and receivers are mobile. 
One aspect of weapons lethality is precision strike.  Precision strike is the ability 
to hit targets with a high degree of accuracy.  Precision strike drives a need for better 
targeting information.  The need for better targeting information drives the need for more 
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and better sensors.  The net effect is to increase the amount of data passed between the 
sensor and the shooter, and the load on C2 systems.   
  
D. BENEFITS OF AUTOMATED C2 SYSTEMS 
Automated C2 systems have the capability to generate and maintain the Common 
Operational Picture (COP).  An Operational Picture is a model of reality rather than a 
discrete thing. Conceptually, the Operational Picture is the shared awareness that the 
commander and his staff have of the current situation.  The concept is formed, shared, 
and maintained by models the commander uses to represent the situation.  For example, 
the Operational Picture can be established on a gridded sand table, with small tanks 
representing units on the ground.   Or the Operational Picture can be represented on 
overlays to a map, with pushpins representing units and hand-drawn lines representing 
various boundaries.  Finally, the Operational Picture can be a computerized display of 
information overlaid on a digital map.  What differentiates the COP from an Operational 
Picture is that two or more commanders share the COP.   
Having everyone use the Common Operational Picture is critical to modern 
warfighting.  Even if some information in the COP is incorrect, having the same data 
across all commands allows for the subject matter expert to correct the mistake one time, 
and then share that correction with everyone else.  The Joint definition of the COP is:  “A 
single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command.”  
[JPUB01, 86]  As indicated in the definition, the COP adds this final component of 
commonality across commands.  An example of a COP display is shown in figure 3 
below. 
One problem with the Joint definition is the use of the words “identical display.”  
COP displays are built out of the data stored in automated systems.  The displays don’t 
need to be identical, but instead the underlying data must be identical.  For instance, a 
maneuver unit may need a display tailored to present maneuver data, while a fire support 
unit may need a display tailored to present fires data.  In Software Engineering, a 
different representation of the same item is known as a View.  Therefore, a View 
corresponds with a “Display,” while the underlying data model must agree between 
systems.   
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Because of this and other subtle differences in the meaning of COP, two other 
terms that represent a portion of the COP are used.  The first term, the Common Relevant 
Operational Picture (CROP), attempts to limit the amount of information that any one 
node must process, using time and space criteria (in other words, “old” data is irrelevant).  
The second term, the Common Tactical Picture (CTP), attempts to limit the amount of 
information that a node must process by limiting the scope of applicability.  GCCS is the 
Joint System of Record for the COP, while subordinate systems may contain the CTP.  In 
either the CTP or the CROP, the commander decides what is relevant, and appropriate 
filters are applied to the COP to generate these views.  For the remainder of this thesis, 
the term COP is used over that of CROP or CTP, emphasizing the need for commonality 
across systems.   
 
Figure 3.   Typical COP Display (Author’s files).  
 
The ability of properly designed automated systems to share the masses of time-
critical information the COP requires across wide distances is unmatched by any 
comparable manual process.  The advantages automation promises are that the 
commander’s span of control of forces can grow to support truly global operations.  
Commanders and staffs can share information and collaborate faster.  Automation 
permits the staff to clear up some of the confusion of battle.  Automating other Command 
and Control functions  (such as fires delivery in the case of AFATDS) provides similar 
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benefits for those functional areas.  Most importantly, automation allows us to execute 
the OODA cycle faster than the enemy.  Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) is the DoD 
buzzword for this quantum leap in the ability to quickly act.     
 
E. USMC C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES 
 
1. Marine Corps View of Systems Architecture 
Generically, Systems Architecture is defined as “Design.  The way components fit 
together.” [IEEE90]   For the Marine Corps, the Systems Architecture is the plan by 
which automated systems and weapons are designed, developed, and procured in order to 
fit together with other systems.  A well-designed and executed Systems Architecture will 
provide the framework for effective Command and Control automation across 
disciplines.  Where there is more than one system, there is a de-facto Systems 
Architecture.  If the architecture is ad-hoc, and systems are bought piecemeal, the 
architecture will be poor.  The important thing is to pre-plan systems development and 
acquisition so that the Systems Architecture that results is the architecture that supports 
the operational requirement.  The operational requirement is often expressed as 
“Operational Architecture.”   
The Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) is the Marine 
Corps’ principal agent for equipping the operating forces to accomplish their mission. 
They are responsible for developing, acquiring, and fielding automated systems.  The 
Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) branch of MARCORSYSCOM is 
responsible for the Marine Corps C2 systems architecture.  Specifically, SE & I is 
chartered to:  
• Create and Maintain the Marine Corps C4ISR1 Systems Architecture 
• Provide macro-level configuration management for C4ISR systems within 
the MARCORSYSCOM 
• Provide interoperability and integration analysis for C4ISR systems within 
the MARCORSYSCOM  [MSEI02A] 
                                                 
1 C4ISR stands for “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance.”  As previously discussed, the term “Command and Control” already contains these added 
elements.  However, variant terms like C3, C4, C4I, and C4ISR are common in the literature.      
19 





























Use the JTA2 to 
build the Systems 
Architecture 
 




Use analytic tools 
to assess where a 
given system “fits” 





Electrical codes of 
house 






Table 1.   “One Architecture, Three Views.” (After [MSEI02B, 4]) 
 
Creating good Systems Architecture from the Ad-Hoc architecture of legacy 
systems is a tall order.  In order to scope the problem, SE&I has built a database (called 
MSTAR, discussed in chapter 7) that accurately describes the current systems.  From the 
database, they have created the  “MAGTF C4ISR Integrated Picture (MCIAP).” The 
MCIAP pictorially represents all currently fielded C2 systems at the echelon of command 
that each system is used.  It further shows the communications links by frequency 
spectrum (or LAN as applicable) between each node in the command chain.  The MCIAP 
had to be 13 feet long by 3 feet high in order to accurately and legibly list all the current 
Marine C2 systems.  This alone shows the complexity of the problem of system-of-
systems integration.  While one can argue whether the architecture depicted on the 
MCIAP is planned or Ad-Hoc, the fact remains that current C2 systems lack the 
interoperability to meet the needs of the FMF.    
                                                 
2 JTA stands for “Joint Technical Architecture.”  The JTA is a collection of interface and other 
technical standards mandated by the Defense Information Systems Agency, and is discussed further later. 
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SE&I is taking steps to better define and refine the C4ISR systems architecture.  
First, they are taking the approved “C4I Support Plan” (C4ISP – see the section on the 
Defense Information Systems Agency below) from the joint community and applying it 
to future Marine Corps system buys.  Second, the SE&I has developed a problem 
targeting process for allocating limited funds.  This process conducts “problem triage” by 
dividing problems into near-term, mid-term, and far-term interoperability issues.  Near-
term issues are defined as those issues that must be handled before the next budgeting 
cycle, while mid-term issues are handled in the next budgeting cycle.  Finally, far-term 
issues are those that occur beyond the next budgeting cycle.  The choice of the budget 
cycle as a delimiter is a natural one for MARCORSYSCOM, as the budgeting cycle 
provides the capital required to make changes.  However, the budgeting cycle is complex 
and maddeningly slow.  Generally, Marines in the FMF will not see the results of a “mid-
term” fix for a minimum of 4 years from the identification of a problem.   
No matter the timeframe of the fix, SE&I is able to bring pressure to bear on 
Marine Program Officers to modify requirements to meet interoperability goals.  These 
program officers also work at MARCORSYSCOM, and each of their programs have 
“Integration Key Performance Parameters” (I-KPP’s) that contractors must meet.  SE&I’s 
intent is to better define these I-KPP’s organizationally, and then require the Program 
officers to force contractors meet them.  Finally, SE&I branch has all C2 systems under 
configuration management, and has tasked MCTSSA with conducting end-to-end 
systems testing.  These efforts are explored further in Chapter 7.   
 
2. Problems with the USMC’s Systems Architecture and Acquisition 
Myriad items prevent reaching the goal of true systems interoperability.  The list 
of items below is a short explanation of the issues most important to the Marine Corps 
interoperability problem.   
 
a. Cultural Inertia 
Institutionally the Marine Corps has embraced C2 automation technology 
as a warfighting enabler.  The rank and file is not so sure.  As previously mentioned, the 
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Corps culture is resistant to change. This list is a representative sample of comments 
about C2 heard from FMF commanders and staffs: 
•  “A computer with a bullet hole in it is a paperweight.  A map with a bullet 
hole in it is still a map.”   
• “I’d rather command from the front, not from behind a computer.”   
• “So now we’re bringing five generators and three dozen computers?”  
• “What’s wrong with voice?  Digital is too hard.” 
The first comment, most recently overheard from a Marine Colonel in 
May 2002, reflects distrust in C2 systems resulting from a perceived lack of system 
availability in combat conditions.  The second comment addresses the position that C2 
systems are for a different (lower) class of people than warfighters and couches the 
argument in terms of leadership.  The third comment reflects the FMF’s experiences with 
unwieldy legacy systems that use excessive valuable combat lift.  The fourth comment 
points to the need for specialized skills to operate automated systems.   
None of these comments bears up under close scrutiny, but insofar as 
Marines feel this way, they tend to act in ways that fulfill their perceptions.  For example, 
a Commander that doesn’t trust C2 systems won’t use them.  If the systems aren’t used, 
the specialized skills that are needed to operate them atrophy.  Without use, the systems 
can’t be improved.   Any spare funds that units receive is not spent on improving 
automated gear, but instead is spent in other ways.  The net result is the status quo is 
maintained to the ultimate detriment of the organization.   
 
b. USMC as System Buyer 
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The Marine Corps is most often a system buyer rather than a system 
developer. [MSEI02C, 3]  The Marine Corps operates this way because it saves costs and 
lowers risks on individual systems.  Another service, as lead developer, must manage the 
program and bear the associated costs.  The lead service must answer questions from 
congress and other oversight bodies about cost, schedule, and performance issues.  Risks 
for the Marine Corps are lowered because at the end of the process, the Marine Corps 
gets the finished product.  Other services like the arrangement because having the Corps 
participate in a project allows for economies of scale, and the item can be marketed as a 
multi-service or joint product. 
Yet, this strategy has significant risks.  Because Marines often fight in the 
seams between the Army, Navy and Air Force (such as in the littorals), interoperability 
requirements are critical for the Corps.  But the Corps may not completely understand the 
complexities of interoperability between the systems.  If the Corps can’t clearly articulate 
its Interoperability Exchange Requirements (IER’s), then the lead service can’t 
implement them.  The linkage between the lead service and the Corps may not be fully 
defined, and a liaison may not be assigned.  If a liaison is assigned and the Corps 
adequately defines its requirements, the lead service may not meet the Marine-specific 
requirement without offsetting funding.  Finally, if a systems development effort is later 
cancelled, there is rarely a backup plan for a replacement system.  The end result is you 
get what you pay for.   
  
c. Stovepiped and Overlapping Development Efforts 
The Corps has several “bright idea” clearinghouses.  In the C2 area, there 
is the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), the Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support 
Activity (MCTSSA), and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  Each of these 
agencies has a charter that gives it some piece of the automation pie.  There are other 
non-Marine supporting agencies such as SPAWAR and contractors that also produce C2 
hardware and software.    Among even this short list, often items are developed without 
consultation or in competition with other agencies.  A real-world example is the 
development of FOFAC/TLDHS/UCATS/MELIOS.  Each of these acronyms represents 
four different takes by four different agencies, representing different interest groups, on 
the same concept of a universal spotter device.  The same situation exists for C2 systems, 
but because of the broader span of control of C2 systems, they are often supported by the 
different warfighting communities.  Coordination between the various systems ought to 
be accomplished via the Systems Architecture, but the Systems Architecture enforcement 
mechanisms are focused on the acquirers, not on the requirements developers.  And the 
Systems Architecture isn’t jealously protected like programs are.     
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d. USMC Seen as a Bit Player Among Competing Interests  
The joint arena may decide that Marine Corps requirements are of lower 
priority than other competing interests.  The other services have specific goals, and these 
goals may be in conflict with Marine goals.  Although the effects of Goldwater-Nichols 
have begun to percolate through the DoD culture, there may still be some interservice 
rivalry that results in serious disagreements about requirements and interoperability.  
Most often, these disagreements are philosophical rather than technical or substantive.  
One example explored more fully later is the inability of the services to agree on a single 
common identifier for a unit.  
 
e. Software Project Management Challenges 
Software intensive systems are much harder to manage than other projects.  
Software is “computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated documentation and 
data pertaining to the operation of a computer system.” [IEEE90, 184] The nature of 
software is different than that of hardware.  One cannot see, touch, taste, smell, or hear 
software, only its effects.  Software isn’t bought in traditional units (I’d like five lines of 
code, please), and having more software doesn’t necessarily mean more capability – in 
fact, it often means having more failures.  Software design and coding is typically 
extremely error prone, and no one expects reliable software after the first attempt.  In 
fact, the first attempt is called “alpha,” and the second, “Beta.”  Often only on the third 
attempt is software even released.   
Managing Software projects is complicated by the lack of good 
requirements.  Few users know what they want until they see it.  Customers may not be 
aware of what the software can do, and therefore may not ask for capability they can’t 
imagine.  In a traditional management paradigm, by the time the customer sees software, 
the money has already been spent and the product has already been developed.  Changes 
are too late.  This is complicated by the DoD acquisition process, which requires people 
to know what they are buying before funds are allocated – almost an impossibility with 
software.  Finally, computer power and processing ability keeps growing exponentially.  
Users “in the know” change requirements during software development process with the 
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expectation that all the interesting features they’ve seen advertised are available for them 
on their project, now.  Yet changing requirements in the middle of a design effort is an 
indicator of a failing project.   
There are no good metrics that correlate to good software.  As already 
mentioned, size (lines of code or number of modules) tells one little about operational 
effectiveness.  Complicated code is not necessarily good code, and one can’t tell which is 
which without extensive experience.  Military software is fundamentally different than 
popular civilian software in several ways.  People depend on weapon system and C2 
software to work correctly all the time – it is mission and time-critical.  Civilian software 
is not so judged.   
These and several other software management issues are the reason why 
“software is now recognized as the highest risk system component in virtually every 
major defense acquisition.” [GSAM00, 33]  These problems are magnified across a 
System-of-Systems.  Each system not designed, developed, and deployed to a common 
standard is tomorrow’s legacy stovepiped system.    
 
 
F. CURRENT C2 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
 
1. Overview 
The Marine Corps operates within the Joint C2 Development environment.  The 
joint environment layers organizational and bureaucratic issues on top of all the other 
technical issues associated with C2.  The Joint C2 development environment is complex, 
and at times chaotic.  Complexities include drastic changes in DoD policy from 
administration to administration and year-to-year, myriad different Joint agencies with 
oversight, and lack of an accepted Joint Systems Architecture.  The primary Joint agency 
is the Defense Information System Agency (DISA).   This section discusses DISA and 





The Defense Information Systems Agency is a DoD support agency under the 
control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications 
and Intelligence [ASD (C3I)].  The Agency began in 1960 as the Defense 
Communications Agency (DCA) to consolidate the communications functions common 
to the military departments.  In 1991, the name was changed to DISA.  Functions given to 
DISA include maintaining the Global Information Grid, which is the sum total of all 
deployed communications and networking assets owned by the DoD.  DISA has an 
interoperability directorate, and is required to test and certify C2 systems for 
interoperability according to the DII COE compliance scale, mentioned below.  The Joint 
Interoperability Test Command (JITC) in Fort Huachuca, AZ conducts this testing.  Of 
note, the services have been delegated this authority to certify their own systems for DII 
COE compliance.  JITC has assumed responsibility only for truly joint systems such as 
GCCS.  The Army certified AFATDS.  
There is a joint Systems Architecture.  DISA maintains the Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computer Information Support Plan (C4ISP).  The C4ISP is a 
collection of documents and pictures that express the “as-is” and “to be” operational 
architectures in DoD.   The C4ISP forms the basis of the Marine Corps’  “C4I for the 
Warrior” (C4IFTW) concept.  However, the C4ISP has taken years to develop, and is 
inclusive of all services and systems.  Therefore it is aimed at the lowest common 
denominator, which hinders interoperability.   
DISA also maintains the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA).  The JTA is a 
collection of computer and interface standards that all automated systems are supposed to 
meet DoD-wide.  Many of these standards are the same as civilian standards.  An 
example JTA standard is the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).  
The JTA forms the basis of all technical architectures.  Meeting the specifications of the 
JTA is not terribly difficult for COTS products, since most of the standards are 
commercial standards to begin with.  Meeting the requirements of the JTA are a little 
more difficult for GOTS and specialized systems (including legacy systems), as they 
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must be designed in and may require code changes.  Yet, meeting the JTA does not 
guarantee interoperability.   
 
3. ASD, AT&L (Interoperability) 
The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (ASD, AT&L), has an Interoperability director.  Projects include the “Global 
Information Grid” and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Reports. [DATL02] 
The relationship between this OSD and DISA, which as previously stated, is under ASD 
C3I, is unclear.  Trying to contact a member of their office proved fruitless.  This is 
another example of the continuing confusion surrounding “who’s in charge” of 
information in the DoD.   
 
4. GIG COE 
The original name for the Global Information Grid was the Defense Information 
Infrastructure (DII).  In the 1998 DII Master Plan, the DII was described in part as, 
“…the web of communications networks, computers, software, databases, applications, 
weapon system interfaces, data, security services, and other services that meet the 
information processing and transport needs of DOD users, across the range of military 
operations.” [DIMP98]  In October 2001, the name was changed by DISA to the Global 
Information Grid (GIG).  [FCWK01]  The name change was meant to reflect a “new way 
of doing business,” focusing on connecting people a la the internet, vice a monolithic, 
single-purpose system.  In fact, the term “GIG” is not often used, and most documents 
still refer to the DII COE.  However in either case the intent is to standardize the logical 
underpinnings of all DoD information systems.  To that end, the Common Operational 
Environment (COE) was established.   
The roots of the COE go back to the Joint Maritime Command Information 
System (JMCIS).  In 1995, Admiral Gauss was working on this Command and Control 
System for the Navy at SPAWAR.  When he went to DISA to become its director, he 
took the Operating System and Common Application Program Interfaces (API’s) and 
made them the de-facto standard for the emerging Global Command and Control System 
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(GCCS).  The collection of these API’s and other standard software was termed the 
Unified Build (UB).  ([BUDD02] and [BULL02])    The GIG COE (or DII COE) is built 
as shown in figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4.   The DII COE Conceptual Model (After [WALK01, 3]). 
 
The model has four layers.  The first three are listed in the bubbles on the left of 
the diagram.  The bottom layer is the Kernel, and interacts directly with the Operating 
System.  The second layer up is “Infrastructure Services,” and contains basic 
communications and administrative functionality.  The third layer is the common support 
applications.  It is this layer that individual Command and Control Systems were 
duplicating again and again – now if someone builds to the COE, those functions do not 
need to be re-written.  The fourth and final layer contains the business and functional 
applications, shown as arches built on the framework of the first three layers.    
Eight Levels of DII COE compliance are specified in the Integration and Run-
Time Specification. (DII COE I&RTS).  Now that DISA was mandating use of the DII 
COE, C2 system program managers and hardware vendors strove to get “DII COE 
compliant,” so they could be certified.  Of course, compliance with the DII COE standard 
will facilitate interoperability.  DII COE compliance is necessary but not sufficient to 
ensure interoperability.  The only problem was that all these programs have long lead 
times, different leadership, and institutional goals that generally supercede 
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interoperability goals.  In order to ensure everyone could be certified, eight levels of DII 
COE compliance were introduced.  The 8 levels are shown in the Table below.  Notice 
that system-of-systems interoperability is not addressed until level 7.    Thus, it is not 
good enough to have a DII COE (or GIG COE) compliant system, but it must be at least 
level 7 or 8 compliant to be truly interoperable.  This is a source of confusion for many 
warfighters.   
Level Name 
1 Standards Compliance 
2 Network Compliance 
3 Platform Compliance 
4 Bootstrap Compliance 
5 Minimal DII Compliance 
6 Intermediate DII Compliance 
7 Interoperable Compliance 
8 Full DII Compliance 




The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reformed the Department of Defense with the 
purpose of reducing the excessive influence of the four services and increasing the power 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the country’s defense needs.  One particularly 
troubling area of interservice rivalry was in acquisition and procurement of non-
interoperable materiel.  This resulted in an inability to fight together because systems 
were not interoperable.  It also wasted resources, as the services would buy duplicative 
items.  [LOCH02, 437]   Therefore, the act strengthened the role of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and gave him a Vice Chairman (VCJCS).  The VCJCS 
chairs the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC), which is composed of the Vice 
chiefs of each of the military services.    
The Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) is the senior military body 
charged with reviewing all major defense acquisition programs for alignment with Joint 
warfighting goals expressed in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).  The JROC 
validates new mission needs, reviews program alternatives, and evaluates programs on 
the merits of their Key Performance Parameters (KPP’s) along the life of the program.  If 
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a program is not meeting its KPP’s, the JROC can recommend that the program be 
modified or cancelled.  Systems interoperability is a KPP.  By controlling the purse 
strings via joint oversight, the intent was to force the services into interoperability.  The 
JROC could be the one single unifying entity in the search for interoperability, as they 
have the military rank and the statutory authority to make difficult calls on funding.  The 
JROC has the responsibility and authority to require interoperability fixes to programs. 
Yet in the fifteen years since Goldwater-Nichols, true joint acquisition reform has 
not occurred.  Instead, the JROC operates by consensus, which means if a service wants 
their project to go forward, the other vice chiefs agree to let it go forward if theirs will 
too.  [LOCH, 443]   Several previous JROC chairmen have expressed frustration that 
deep-seated service resistance thwarts their best intentions. [LEDE99, 95]  Further, 
congress has never called the Chairman of the JROC to testify on budgetary issues, 
despite its statutory role.  [LEDE99, 95]  This lack of credibility with congress translates 
to a lack of ability to meet oversight goals. The one internal oversight body with the 
power to force interoperability has not lived up to expectations.   
 
6. SPAWAR Charleston 
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston, South Carolina, serves 
as the project engineer for the Marine Corps on several major Command and Control 
Systems.  The table below lists several of the systems that SPAWAR Charleston 









Acronym Short Title Description 
GCCS Global Command 
and Control System 
Provides the fielding plan, hardware, and software 
builds for the GCCS terminals in the Marine Corps 
DACT Data Automated 
Communications 
Terminal 
Provides the terminal for Forward Observers to 





Provides digital radio communications between C2 
nodes.   
IAS Intelligence 
Analysis System 
Collates and provides intelligence information from 
multiple intelligence sources.  IAS software is what 
differentiates IOS (V2) from IOS (V1). 
IOS Intelligence-
Operations Server 
DII COE compliant hardware and software.  IOS 
(V1) is TCO software; IOS (V2) is TCO and IAS 
software. 
TCO Tactical Combat 
Operations 
Software that maintains the Common Operational 
Picture at the Division and below.   
Table 3.    Pertinent C2 Projects at SPAWAR Charleston 
 
From an interoperability standpoint, it is advantageous to have the several system 
developers resident in the same building.  As discussed later with IOS, there has already 
been significant consolidation among the various systems and funding lines.  Further, 
SPAWAR Charleston clearly has support of the warfighter in mind.  Specifically, they 
have created a communications website, using collaborative technologies, that allows all 
users with an HTML browser and appropriate permission to communicate with Project 
Officers, Requirements Generators, and project engineers.  [SPAW02]  Each project has 
Point of Contact listings and a “discussion room” that permits valuable group interaction.  
This website, called TACMOBILE, is one of the critical items in making C2 systems 
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III. THE UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Software must model the real world.  The fidelity of the software model to the 
real world is a good indicator of whether the software product is effective or not.  An 
example from the financial world could be a bank account.  In the past, there was a stack 
of money that customers gave to the bank.  The customer had physical items (gold or 
bills and coin) to hand over to the bank, that the bank kept.  The bank may have paid 
interest, which could be withdrawn along with the principal.  Either way, the customer 
knew where the money was located, and could make a withdrawal.  Then along came 
software and automated record keeping.  There may not be any bills or coin in the bank 
vault, but the customer expects the software to accurately model his or her bank account, 
including the interest.  Both the bank and the customers trust the software with a very 
important asset – money.  Further, the customer can now do so much more – say go to 
Europe and withdraw money denominated in Euro’s from his or her same account.  
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) has become the de-facto standard 
software modeling language.  The UML is useful for eliciting the business rules and 
processes that form the basis for software modeling, for generating requirements, for 
design, and for coding of object-oriented systems.  The UML provides an easily 
extensible common visual language for representing objects and their interactions.  Grady 
Booch, one of the principal authors of the UML, states; “UML is a graphical language for 
visualizing, specifying, constructing, and documenting the artifacts of a software-
intensive system.” [BOOC97, xv]   
UML is an effective solution to eliminate the Tower of Babel problems previously 
extant in the Software domain.  Previous methods of software modeling presentation 
were heavily personality dependent, and the semantics and syntax of the various 
modeling languages were a constant source of debate.  UML standardizes the language 
semantics and syntax, while providing a method to easily extend UML to fit those 
situations where the basic language can’t adequately communicate.    
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1. Object Orientation 
The portion of the world that a particular software application attempts to model 
is known as the problem domain.  Objects are things, concepts, or entities associated with 
the problem domain.  [LARM98, 6]  Example objects in the banking problem domain 
could be money, ATM, and account.  Example objects in the C2 problem domain could 
be friendly unit, country boundary, and map.  Object-oriented analysis (OOA) focuses on 
identifying all the relevant objects in the problem domain that allows answering the 
questions the software was designed for.  In the banking example, if we only want to 
know about savings, we would model savings accounts and a check might not be an 
object.  This is a model with low fidelity.  If we wanted to have a banking model with 
higher fidelity, then we could model savings, checking, and loan accounts.   
Objects in OOA are associated with other objects.  The job of the analyst is to 
capture the attributes of the objects, the associations the objects have with other objects, 
and the actions the objects can take.  This data is collected along with the desires of the 
customer about what the software system is supposed to do.  These requirements and 
object descriptions lead to a more formal definition of the requirements for the software 
system.   How the objects interact with each other is captured not only in the associations, 
but also in the business rules that are in the problem domain.  These business rules are 
captured in a “Business Use Case.”  The Business Use Case is a step-by-step description 
of what happens in a given situation.     
Object-oriented analysis leads to object-oriented design.  Object-Oriented Design 
(OOD) focuses on designing software objects that correspond to the objects discovered in 
OOA.  The design is then encoded into an object-oriented programming language.  
During the design stage, objects are given attributes and methods.  An attribute is a 
particular feature of the object, while a method is what the object can do.  Returning to 
the banking example, an account has an attribute called “balance,” which is expressed in 
dollars and cents.  If we imagine an account can check its own balance and report it, then 
account could have a method called “get balance” (or getBalance) which would report the 
balance in dollars and cents.  Following the same concept in the C2 world, a friendly unit 
34 
could have an attribute indicating how large the unit was (numbers of people), and it 
could change geographic locations (move). 
OOD leads to object oriented code.  In order to do this, the essential features of 
each set of the same or similar objects are abstracted into object Classes.  A Class is a 
framework for objects of the same name.  Returning again to the Command and Control 
example, a Class might be “Friendly Unit,” with objects in that class being 1st Platoon, 
2nd Platoon, and 3rd Platoon.  These platoons are instances of the Friendly Unit Class.  
Once they are created (creation is known as instantiation), they keep all their own 
attributes and methods until specifically destroyed.  If the Friendly Unit Class has a Move 
method, then each platoon can move independently and remember where it is.   
Object orientation is just one way to look at the world, but object-orientation 
captures data and actions in a way that supports some basic software goals.  The primary 
goal is working software with less complexity for the developers and programmers.  
Object orientation supports that by hiding the internals of objects from other objects so 
they can’t interfere with each other.  It also supports software reuse by allowing objects 
to inherit attributes and methods from other objects.   Finally, objects can remember 
things about themselves, an important attribute for software systems.   
 
2. Advantages of UML 
There are many ways of modeling real-world processes and converting those 
models into working software.  In fact, there are too many methods.  The primary 
advantage of UML is that it has gained wide acceptance in the software development 
world and has become the language of choice to represent OOA/OOD.  Of course, it 
became popular because UML had some specific advantages over previous methods.   
UML is visual, allowing people to visualize how software models interact.  The 
visual components are standardized and fairly easy to learn and manipulate.  UML is 
extensible.  This means that there is a standard way of adding features to the language if 
there are items in the problem domain that do not fit the standard.  Being object-oriented, 
UML models lend themselves to direct conversion into code using an object-oriented 
language such as Ada, C++, Java, or SmallTalk.  This conversion can be done 
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mechanically, and in fact there are several software packages that will turn sufficiently 
detailed UML models into computer code.   
 
3. Why UML is Useful for this Project 
UML was developed starting in 1994.  [BOOC99, xix]  The AFATDS project 
started in 1981, and used a different software modeling process to describe the business 
rules in the Fire Support Problem domain.  The primary precursor to the IOS software 
suite was being developed from other software in 1995, and also did not use UML.  Yet, 
UML allows presentation of complex topics in a visual, simple way.  Using UML permits 
an appropriate level of abstraction. Finally, since both systems were developed 
completely differently, UML serves as a common description language of the military’s 
business rules and these systems.   
 
B. USE CASES 
The first step in object-oriented analysis of a problem domain is to find objects 
and business rules.  Objects become classes.  Business rules become Use Cases. 
Decisions are made about what the software we are designing is supposed to do.  In order 
to better understand the UML, we will model a simple process from the Command and 
Control Arena – create and move an infantry platoon.  The name of the platoon is 1st 
platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines.  It is composed of 3 squads.  It is full 
strength.  It is at a particular location, location X.  The Commander orders it to move to 
location Y.   The software system we are designing takes automatic data updates over 
tactical radios from a GPS receiver at the platoon.  The Tables below lists the 
requirements for the software System and the Use Case for this scenario.   
 
User Requirement: Sub-Category Requirement 
Number 
Store Unit info • Store Name 
• Store Unit Strength 
R1.1 
R1.2 
Track Unit • Automatically Update location R2 
Table 4.   Unit Tracking System Requirements 
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USE CASE: Unit Tracking System: Track Unit 
Actors: Commander, Friendly Unit 
Purpose: Accurately model a moving unit.   
Overview: This Use Case describes a command and control system that 
tracks moving units using automatically updating GPS 
coordinates.   The system must be powered on and 
communications must be set up prior to entering this Use Case. 
Type: Primary and Essential 
Cross References: R1.1-1.2, R2 
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This Use Case is initiated when an 
operator (working for a commander) creates 
a unit in the system.  The operator enters the 
Unit Name, Unit Strength, and Unit 
communications ID.   
 
 2.  The system loads the data and listens 
for messages from that unit, using the 
Unit Communications ID.   
3. The unit GPS receiver periodically reports 
its position.  
 
 4.  The system displays the unit as an icon 
on a map displayed on the screen.  
Information includes the Unit Strength 
and Unit Name.   
5.  The commander orders the unit to move.    
 6.  The system displays the unit as it 
moves.     
ALTERNATE Courses: Step 4:  If the system does not detect the unit communications 
ID within a commander-definable period, the system alerts the operator that 
communications have not been established.     




Actors are people that use the software.  Actors can also be other software that 
uses the software we’re designing.  The key is that Actors are outside the software we are 
designing.  In table 5 above, the Actors are the Commander and the Friendly Unit.  The 
Friendly Unit contains a sensor.  The sensor is not a person but a device that sends its 
position.  The sensor could be in this Use Case if the designers thought it would be 
important to accurately model the situation.  Also notice that “Friendly Unit” is an actor, 
not 1st Platoon.  1st Platoon could be used, but the system is designed to handle many 
reporting units besides 1st Platoon.  Finally, often positions that are not critical to the 
understanding of the Use Case are not listed.  This is the case with the operator, who 
needs to be there, but acts as an interface between the Commander and the system.   
In UML, a Use Case is diagrammed as shown in figure 5 below.  The bubble is 
the Use Case, while the box represents the system boundary and the stick figures 
represent the Actors.  There can be several Use Cases inside the system, and there would 
be a Use Case narrative for them as well.  The lines that connect the Actors to the Use 
Case indicate an association between the Use Case and the Actors.  The nature of the 
association is described in the Use Case narrative.   
 
Figure 5.   Unit Tracking System 
 
2. Classes 
Continuing with this example, two classes that can be derived from this Use case 
are the Friendly Unit Class and Map Class.  The Friendly Unit has attributes of Unit 
Strength, Unit Name, location, and Communications ID.   The Map Class has lower left 
hand corner location and scale.  There are many other attributes that can be attached to 
these classes.  There is no limit to attributes that can be associated with Classes in the 
model, although of course there are practical limits to how much a computer system can 
store and process.  The Friendly Unit has a method called Move, which takes a location 
and moves the unit to that location.  In the real world it matters how location is 
represented – let’s say for this example that locations are in the Military Grid Reference 
System (MGRS), and that six digits are sufficient.  When designing an actual system, all 
these types of requirements (what type of data and how its represented) are critical for the 
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system users to define for the system designers.  Figure 6 below shows how these classes 
are represented in the UML.   
 
Figure 6.   UML Example Class Diagram 
For each class, the top part of the class box shows the Class Name.  The middle 
part of the box lists all the Class’s attributes.  The bottom box lists the Class’s methods.  
The plus sign in front of each attribute and method indicates that the attributes and 
methods are visible outside the class.   The minus sign in front of UnitLocation in the 
FriendlyUnitClass means that attribute is not visible outside the class.  What this means is 
that a new location can only be accessed via the Move method.  This is an example of 
data hiding – now the location of the unit is protected from some programmer errors.  
Notice also that each attribute is defined in terms of the language – in this case, Strength 
is an integer variable, and it is up to the system designers to define (in the comments and 
by proper usage) that Strength means number of people.  Or an alternate tack can be 
taken where the designers define their own data type.  An example user-defined type is 
Location in the figure above.  Another Class diagram would show what a Location 
consists of.     
 
C. COLLABORATIONS 
After the Classes and Use Cases have been determined, the Use Cases are 
evaluated to determine the order of activity in the diagrams.  There are two major 
methods used to show collaboration in the UML.  The first method is with a collaboration 
diagram, and the second is with a Sequence Diagram.  The two diagrams are functionally 
very similar.  Both diagrams are shown here for a portion of our example Use Case.  
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 Figure 7 shows a collaboration diagram for the action of the Commander moving 
First Platoon.  In this example, the commander orders the unit to move.  This first action 
is reflected by First Platoon’s sensor periodically reporting a new location, which is 
displayed on the current map.  Notice the associations show the use of the methods 
previously declared for the various Classes.  Also notice that 1st Plt is an instance of the 
Friendly Unit Class.  These actions are not constrained by time.  The only thing specified 
is the order of execution.    
 
Figure 7.   UML Collaboration Diagram 
 
Figure 8 shows the equivalent UML Sequence Diagram.  In this diagram, the 
Objects and Actors are listed across the top.  Each object and Actor has a lifeline 
corresponding to it. Time flows from top to bottom. Action is signified by sending 
messages.  On the diagram, messages have an arrow going from the originator to the 
receiver.  Exactly what time something happens is not specified, but again the order of 
message delivery is specified.  
The boxed message in the middle of the diagram is a comment, and is placed over 
the system boundary.  Notice the Commander is external to the system.  Of course, First 
Platoon is outside the system as well, but the actual first platoon is not on this diagram – 
only the 1st Plt object inside the system is depicted.  There can also be lines going from 
an object back to the same object.  This represents computer processing internal to an 
object.  Often, these lines indicate a process that takes extra time or shows processing that 
supports further message passing in later steps.     
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All the drawings and documents created during the software development process 
are called artifacts.  One software development process (the Unified Process) has broken 
down the phases of software development into Inception, Elaboration, Construction, and 
Transition.  The diagrams produced here cover parts of the inception and elaboration 
phases.  However, in order to develop software, several other artifacts are needed, at a 
greater level of detail.  These artifacts can also be expressed in UML and its associated 
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IV. THE INTELLIGENCE – OPERATIONS SERVER (IOS) 
SOFTWARE SUITE 
IOS is the Marine Corps program that supplies the intelligence, communications 
and processing capability needed to meet the Commander’s requirement for C2 at the 
tactical level.  IOS receives, fuses, displays, and disseminates selected operational input 
from the MAGTF’s other C2 systems.  It is intended to meet the need for the commander 





The history of the Intelligence-Operations Server is not well documented.  Unlike 
AFATDS, which has had the sponsorship of the Army, the artillery community, a 
program office and program managers for the length of the program, IOS evolved from a 
collection of different program offices and programs that were developed over a period of 
years.  In general, the software from which IOS is composed was written to meet the 
needs of the Navy and the Maritime C2 environment.  This environment and the Navy’s 
unique approach to Command and Control drove many of the software design decisions.  
Interoperability with ground C2 systems was not a primary goal of the original systems. 
In order to better understand the drivers behind IOS, it is appropriate to study the aspects 
of the Maritime Command and Control Environment.     
 
2. The Maritime Command and Control Environment 
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Each Naval ship has a significant amount of autonomy.  Likewise, a Naval 
battlegroup also has significant authority and responsibility to carry out assigned tasks 
with limited involvement from higher units.  Area coordination between battlegroups is 
accomplished through assignment of geographic Areas of Responsibility (AOR’s).  
AOR’s are large, allowing for significant maneuver room for the individual battlegroup.  
When at sea, communications between ships have always been severely limited by 
distance and the mobile nature of seagoing vessels.   Therefore, ships tended to be self-
contained, self-supporting units with strong internal bonds and the ability to carry out 
assigned missions with a maximum of autonomy.   
In this environment, the focus on C2 functions such as intelligence gathering was 
on internal needs, rather than on reporting to higher units or maneuvering as part of a 
group.  Typical questions were: how far away is the nearest land?  Where is the rest of 
the battlegroup?  How far is the enemy from me and how fast is he closing?  Once the 
captain of the ship gained enough situational awareness, he could make decisions and act 
autonomously.  Radar, observer, and other sensor feeds were processed and collated 
aboard ship in the Combat Information Center (CIC).  Many times, decisions could be 
made with a minimum of information – for example, a Radar contact could be deemed 
hostile if it was moving toward the ship at a high rate of speed without radio contact.   
As radio communications became more robust, there was a natural desire to share 
information between ships in a battlegroup in order to better task organize.  For instance, 
in a Carrier Battlegroup, one ship would be given the Anti-Air Defense Coordinator 
(AADC) role, responsible for protecting the battlegroup from air attack.  This meant that 
such a ship would need the complete air picture for some distance around the battlegroup 
in order to protect it.  Because of the limited communications bandwidth and the 
multicast nature of radio communications, radio networks were designed to pass the 
minimum amount of information possible.  Only the most important information was 
passed.  This information amounted to the type of contact, and its location, course, and 
speed.  This position-location information was called a “track” because in general, the 
information was displayed as an icon with a leader indicating course and speed on a 
display.  Sailors initially maintained these Manual C2 displays by writing the information 
with grease pencils on clear boards.  As these manual displays were automated, the 
terminology remained.   
In naval circles, a track is a single item to be displayed in the COP, like a ship.  
Many details about the ship were unimportant for immediate decision-making.  Important 
information about a track included its location, bearing, and speed.  It also mattered what 
type track it was - whether it was above, on, or under the sea.  As Naval C2 systems 
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developed into multi-service systems, the definition of a track began to change.  In 2002, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined a track thus: 
A track is a single entity reported on the COP such as an aircraft, ship, 
TBM [Tactical Ballistic Missile] or emitter location.  A track can also 
designate an aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, 
and support elements or any other operationally significant item. 
[JCOP02A] 
One can see the naval history to this term in the first sentence – a track was 
traditionally a single entity reported to the ship.  The second sentence demonstrates the 
change in the definition of the term beyond its original meaning.  However, changing the 
definition of a track in a dictionary to include ground scenarios is much different than 
independently developing a concept of the data needed to represent a ground unit.   
In an ocean environment, maps could be rudimentary – the ocean is flat.  
Navigators handled navigation with specialized maps and systems, and generally 
navigation was done without the aid of C2 systems.  Important spatial information for the 
C2 systems were the AOR and other man-made control measures, and the location of the 
shoreline in relation to the ship.  It was in this context that Naval Command and Control 
Systems were developed.   
 
3. Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) 
Although the history of Naval Command and Control systems starts long before 
JMCIS, JMCIS is the father of the current Naval C2 systems, to include the Global 
Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M).  In fact, DISA took the Unified 
Build from the JMCIS program.  Figure 9 below shows the evolutionary development of 
JMCIS from the myriad stovepiped Naval Command and Control Systems developed 
during the 1970’s through 1995.   
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Figure 9.   JMCIS Lineage (After [BUDD02]) 
 
The Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR) had responsibility for 
developing JMCIS.  Understanding exactly what each acronym stands for in the diagram 
is unimportant.  What is interesting about the lineage shown in Figure 9 is its 
evolutionary nature and the ability of the Navy to get the developers of the other C2 
systems to relinquish control of their Programs of Record and budget in favor of a 
common system.  Of course, many technical and systemic hurdles had to be overcome in 
order to completely integrate these programs.  Rather than integrating systems, JMCIS 
engulfed these systems – taking the funding and personnel from each.   
From an organizational standpoint, integration became feasible as people realized 
the massive duplication of effort inherent in the development of different systems. Each 
system had up to 80% of its software functionality in common with the others.   For 
example, each system had methods to display charts, to place tracks on the chart, to send 
and process alerts, to “chat” (collaborate between nodes) and send messages, etc.  Some 
programs were even sharing code for these common functions.  [BUDD02]   Using the 
JMCIS program, SPAWAR separated these common functions into the “Unified Build 
(UB).”  The UB packaged these common modules into a “Government Off the Shelf 
46 
(GOTS)” package with common Application Program Interfaces (API’s) for each 
segment3.  These API’s were standardized methods for programmers to access the 
functionality contained in the UB.  The net effect was for a given specialized C2 system, 
the amount of work needed to deliver the required functions drastically decreased.   To 
accomplish a domain-specific mission, each developer had only to develop a segment 
that then called the UB API’s for services.  DISA took the UB to form the basis of the 
Common Operational Environment (version 3.x).  The UB also became the core system 
for the Global Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M).   
JMCIS and the follow-on systems were appropriated and modified because they 
were successful Naval C2 systems.  However JMCIS’ development was not well 
documented, and the requirements and design decisions surrounding JMCIS have never 
been put to paper or studied.  As evidence of this lack of developmental rigor, there is 
still no delineation in the literature between GCCS-M and JMCIS.  This is made clear in 
the current (version 3.1.2.1) GCCS-M Segment Description Document, which has a 
disclaimer that JMCIS terms may be seen throughout. [GSDD01]  This lack of any sort of 
documentation, especially of requirements and design decisions, hinders development of 
interoperable systems.   
  
4. Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) 
In 1992, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (the USMC 
organization responsible for operational requirements) issued a Mission Need Statement 
(MNS) for a ground C2 system.  Specific needs were “…to receive, fuse, display, and 
disseminate selected operational input from the MAGTF’s other C2 systems.”  
[TMNS92, 1]  The term “operational input” is not defined in the MNS, but it can be 
surmised from context that the authors meant electronic data.  Also inherent in this need 
is the requirement for interoperability with the MAGTF’s other C2 systems.  The authors 
                                                 
3 In JMCIS, GCCS, and DISA terminology, a “segment” is a particular function seen by the user.  
A segment often has more than one software module, but provides a seamless interface to the user.  For 
example, the Joint Mapping Toolkit (JMTK) segment has a client software module and a server software 
module, but the user only interfaces with the client module. [GSDD01] 
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further emphasized interoperability in the MNS by explicitly listing many current C2 
initiatives that TCO had to interface with. Yet, many of these systems were “currently in 
development” when the MNS was written.    In the fire support area for example, an 
interface was required with “Fireflex,” a system the Corps was to develop on its own.  
[TMNS, 5]  Fireflex was never developed due to lack of funding and the ultimate choice 
of AFATDS as the Fire Support System of Record.    
By 1995, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command had developed a 
“Concept of Employment” (COE) for TCO that applied the TCO to the MEF down to the 
Battalion and Squadron levels.  [TCOE95]  This tactical level of warfare was not well 
served by the developing Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which was 
more suited to the strategic and operational levels.  By differentiating itself from GCCS, 
TCO became a Program of Record and had its own funding and project office.  Also, 
GCCS was a joint project, and the Corps wanted control of this tactical system.  The COE 
again emphasized integration of TCO with other MAGTF C2 systems from the functional 
areas of maneuver, fire support, intelligence, air operations, combat service support, and 
Command and Control Warfare.  By this time, the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD, generated by the Marine Corps Systems Command as an acquisition document) 
listed a requirement for TCO to interface with AFATDS, with the interoperability 
standard being reached by 3rd Quarter FY 1997.  [TORD95, 7].  However, what 
“interoperability” meant was not defined in any TCO document.  In September 1995, the 
TCO Integrated Program Summary had officially tied TCO to the JMCIS project.  
[TIPS95] 
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From an operational standpoint, the connection between JMCIS and TCO is not 
immediately apparent.  TCO was supposed to meet the Ground Commander’s need for a 
C2 system.  JMCIS is a maritime system.  These different environments have markedly 
different requirements.  Yet, there were several advantages.  Parallel development 
allowed the Marine Corps to save money when compared to an independent development 
effort.  Also, it was clear the Navy was serious about their own system integration in 
JMCIS.  JMCIS software was showing promise.  This gave Marine leaders confidence 
that the JMCIS project was viable.   Finally, this was about the time that DISA began 
mandating a Common Operating Environment, and so TCO was ahead of the game in 
meeting joint requirements.  TCO as deployed therefore became a subset of JMCIS 
segments deployed on Common Hardware.     
 
5. Intelligence-Operations Server (IOS) 
The desire to integrate disparate systems continues.  Even the use of language is 
important in this initiative.  The term “Intelligence-Operations Server” is descriptive of 
where the Corps wants to go – one server at each maneuver unit that will “seamlessly” 
support the commander’s information requirements and C2.  In order to achieve this goal, 
the intelligence functions contained in other programs such as the Intelligence Analysis 
System (IAS) must be merged (on the same server) with TCO.  Maneuver units do not 
have a plethora of people to maintain systems, and having one server instead of two is an 
obvious benefit.  Also, the Marine Corps wants standardized hardware across the FMF.  
See figure 10 below for an idea of the size of the current IOS hardware suite – 4 person 
lift.  The box contains the Sun Netra server.   
 
Figure 10.   IOS in a tactical environment.   
 
In 2001, TCO became IOS (version 1).  There is no Mission Needs Statement 
(MNS) or Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) for the IOS.  The Program 
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Manager instead uses the TCO Program of Record, ORD, and funding.  [PECK02]  The 
Corps still receives funding for TCO, but it is spent on IOS.  IOS (version 2) is TCO with 
the addition of IAS.  SPAWAR Charleston is the system developer for TCO, IOS, IAS, 
and eleven other systems for the Marine Corps.  Because the same center develops these 
ground products, there is significant synergy between the different programs.  The IOS 
(Version 1 and 2) software runs on a Sun Netra 1125t Station.  The operating system is 
Solaris V. 2.5.1.  There are no current plans for IOS to migrate away from Solaris. 
 
B. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS  
This discussion focuses on IOS (v. 1) as fielded.  The process used for 
requirements will be to list a subset of the user requirements derived from the U.S. 
Marine TCO ORD [TORD95] and TCO COE [TCOE95].  There are several problems 
with this approach.  First, the authors of the ORD and COE used the English language to 
describe C2 concepts that are not easily described in words, while attempting to minimize 
the respective documents.  They were unable to accurately state what the system should 
do.  Few example C2 systems existed in 1995 for comparison.   Second, C2 requirements 
have evolved significantly since then, and there is no documentation extant today that 
accurately lists current requirements.  As with most computing systems, the user needs to 
see a prototype before “it feels right.”  When it comes to generating requirements, users 
often say “they’ll know it when they see it.”   
There is no history of program development.  Therefore, one must use 
engineering judgment to interpret what functionality is in the current software and 
extrapolate back to the requirement that drove that functionality.  From the derived 
operational requirements, a UML model with Actors, Use Cases and Class diagrams will 
be produced.  Operational requirements are better understood in the context of the Marine 
Corps tactical organization for combat.  For readers unfamiliar with U.S. Marine Corps 
Organization, Appendix B clarifies U.S. Marine combat and fire support relationships 




 1. Selected User Requirements 
The Requirements listed below are listed in a building-block fashion.  The 
primary requirement for a Common Operational Picture (vice just an Operational Picture) 
is communication between nodes, so it is listed first.   
User Requirement: Sub-Category Requirement 
Number 
Communicate Digitally  • Establish Communications 
• Manage Alerts 
• Autoforward messages 
• Filter incoming/outgoing messages 
• Unicast data 
• Broadcast data 


















Manage Maps • Display DMA products 
• Change scale 
R3.1 
R3.2 
Manage Friendly Tracks • Update Locations  
• Manage Track Data 
• Correlate and aggregate Tracks 






Manage Enemy Tracks • Update Locations 
• Manage Track Data 
• Correlate and merge Tracks 





Manage Overlays • Add/Delete/update boundaries and 
graphics 
• Associate Overlays with OPLANs 
• Activate/Deactivate Overlay 
• Filter Units based on Overlay 















As explained in Chapter III, in the UML, actors are the people, things, or systems 
that interact with Use Cases.  They are external to the IOS system.  In the military, and 
thus in IOS, the same sequence of Actors is repeated for each level of the military 
hierarchy.  For example, there is a Battalion Commander and a Regimental Commander.  
These are specializations of the Actor Role of “Commander.”   These specializations are 
reflected in the IOS when it is important for processing.  The following table lists the 
characteristics of the principal Actors in the IOS.   
 
Actor Role Name Description Example Instances 
Commander The commander role is that of the person 
given responsibility and authority to 
prosecute a campaign.  The commander sets 
warfighting policies that are then encoded 
into IOS (an example encoding is overlays).  
The commander expects the information and 
data in IOS to be correct, and looks to IOS 
for situational awareness. 
 
• Battalion CO 
• Regimental CO 
• Division CO 
Staff A member of the commander’s staff fills the 
staff role.  The staff is responsible for 
implementing the Commander’s policy.  
Staff provides human oversight of IOS 
operations.  At least one member of the Staff 
serves as the COP Track Correlator (The 
“TOP COP.”) 





Sensor The sensor provides the sensing function for 









Friendly Unit A friendly unit is an actor because it is 
external to IOS.  IOS models friendly units, 
but friendly units take independent action 





• Mortar Platoon 
• Airplane 
Table 7.   IOS Actors 
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One or more IOS operators support each actor, and IOS servers are setup and 
maintained by IOS administrators.  These roles are critical to correct operation of IOS, 
and their interaction with the IOS will be assumed for the remainder of this document.   
Note that Friendly Units are actors, but in IOS, units are modeled as Tracks.  
Second, Enemy Units are not Actors, because in normal operation, there is no interaction 
between an Enemy Unit and IOS (they will not be entering data or initiating actions).   
Friendly Units can be sensors but because of its importance to the Command and Control 
process, the sensing function must be listed separately.  Of course, sensors don’t have to 
be units.   
 
3. Essential Use Cases 
Since there is no published IOS System Architecture,  Use Cases must be 
inferred.  Figure 11 below depicts three of the high-level essential Use Cases for the IOS.  
The IOS fulfills the requirements of these Use Cases.  This evaluation will focus on the 
first two Use Cases.   
 




 In the Use Case narratives below, the Requirement list is derived from Table 6.      
USE CASE: Provide COP 
Actors: Commander, Staff, Friendly Unit, Sensor 
Purpose: Use IOS to accurately model the Operational Area. 
Overview: This Use Case describes the steps necessary to prepare IOS for 
use.  Prior to entering this Use Case, IOS station 
communications hardware must be set up.  The user must 
understand which nodes he wants to connect, and have the 
detailed networking information needed in a typical TCP/IP 
network.  
Type: Primary and Essential 
Cross References: R1.1-1.6, R2.1-2.4, R3.1, 3.2, R4.1-4.4, R5.1-5.4, R6.1-6.5 
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This Use Case is initiated when a 
particular IOS server is powered on.   
 
 2.  The system loads from an IOS CD-
ROM, containing the DII COE Unified 
Build software and selected GCCS 3.x 
segments. Loading takes 45 minutes.  The 
system presents a login screen. 
3. The user logs in as sysadmin.  The 
administrator sets up networking by using 
an “IOS configuration Wizard.”  Entries 
range from “Hostname” to “Primary DNS 
Nameserver.” 
 
 4.  The IOS takes the information and 
modifies the appropriate UB and GCCS 
segments and Solaris files to set up 
networking.  Segment categories include 
communications, database, and track 
management segments. 
5.  The administrator configures the Track 
Database Manager (Tdbm), which is a 
server process residing on an IOS.  
 
 6.  The Tdbm segment is updated with the 
master/slave configuration selected.  The 
Tdbm segment begins processing data.   
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7.  The user sets up more network and node 
data by editing the /etc/hosts and other 
critical files.  The user can use Ping or other 
Solaris commands to verify connections.  
The User modifies the Defense Data 
Network (DDN) tables to set up network 
topology.    
 
 8.  IOS is now ready to operate as a 
network server for COP data.   
9.  Client stations and sensors create COP 
objects (such as Tracks) and propagates 
them by transmission in any of a number of 
common message formats, including OTH-
Gold.  Every attribute of a Track can be 
modified as needed.  Clients can filter COP 
data at the workstation using overlays. 
 
 10.  Server segments process incoming 
messages and broadcast or unicast 
messages based on the network topology.   
11.  The senior Command becomes the 
Track Correlator (the “TOP COP”).  The 
track correlator runs several segments that 
allow him to merge tracks and ensure data 
remains consistent within the network. 
 
 12.  The IOS integrated databases (Tdbm) 
merge the tracks as required and presents 
the COP.   
ALTERNATE Courses: Step 12:  If the server becomes unavailable, a server monitoring 
process (the Joint Process Monitor) warns the client with an icon on the client’s screen.   
Table 8.   Essential Use Case Provide COP (IOS) 
 
 
USE CASE: Command Forces 
Actors: Commander, Staff, Friendly Unit 
Purpose: Use IOS to send the information required to Command and 
Control Forces.  This Command and Control information 
includes the tactical database, Operations Orders, plans, and 
overlays, messages, and alerts. 
Overview: This Use Case describes the steps involved in communicating 
Command and Control information from one node to another. 
The enemy situation is not part of this Use Case.  The Use 
Case “Provide COP” must be complete prior to entry into this 
Use Case.   
Type: Primary and Essential 
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Cross References: R1.1-1.7, R2.1-2.5, R3.1,3.2, R4.1-4.4, R6.1-6.3 
Actor Action System Response 
1. This Use Case is initiated when a user on 
an IOS client machine (such as a workstation 
running C2PC software) creates an 
Operation Order, Plan, message, or alert.  
The user uses the Joint Mapping Toolkit 
(JMTK) to display mapping data.  The user 
creates written products and map overlays as 
needed to produce an order.   
 
 2.  The C2PC software provides an 
integrated set of tools to create the order.     
3. The user selects the recipients.  If the 
client knows the address of the recipient, the 
address is added.  Otherwise, the user enters 
the address, and sends the product.   
 
 4.  The C2PC software logs the message 
and sends the message to the IOS.  The 
IOS resolves the addresses and sends the 
products to the appropriate clients.  
Messages are sent in common format.   
5.  The recipients receive the message on 
their client.  If they have set the alert criteria, 
an audible alert is sounded signifying an 
incoming message.   
 
ALTERNATE Courses: None 
 
Table 9.   Essential Use Case Command Forces (IOS) 
 
4. COP Network 
The IOS meets the requirements and Use Cases listed above using a system 
network overlaid on the military organization (see Appendix B for an example military 
organization).  From the perspective of an IOS at the Regimental Combat Operations 
Center (COC), the IOS has relationships with other COC’s.   The relationships are 
defined by the information contained in the network routing tables.  There is no 
knowledge of which nodes are “higher” or “adjacent,” because the only information the 
IOS has about them is their name and network address.  Actors overlay meaning on the 
nodes and set up broadcast and unicast forwarding patterns based on their perception of 
how information should travel.  IOS does know, however, which is the Track Database 
Manager (Tdbm) Master station for COP synchronization, and that process is hidden 
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from the user in normal operation.  There are other databases that have a similar 
relationship between IOS nodes, but for brevity they are not mentioned by name.   
Given the scenario in Appendix B, there is only one IOS, and that is at the 
Regimental COC.  The remainder are IOS clients.  The regimental COC is the “TOP 
COP” responsible for track correlation and track management.  This requires active staff 
participation via a “Track Correlator.”  Figure 12 below depicts the IOS Network.  In the 
Figure, the COP network is carried over UHF frequencies by the Enhanced Position-
Location Radio System (EPLRS).  This network is a point-to-point (unicast) network, but 
will be a multicast network in the near future.  At each of the Battalions, one C2PC acts 
as a gateway for all the C2PC clients at the Battalion COC.  The gateway is labeled as a 
C2PC GW.  (At the Artillery Battalion, the COC is called the Fire Direction Center – 
FDC.)   
 





5. Derived IOS Classes  
The pertinent objects in the IOS model are graphically depicted in Figures 13 and 
14 below.  The first Figure shows the overall concept for management and display of the 
COP.  There are more items in the COP that are not indicated and irrelevant to this 
discussion.  In the Figure, a “View” corresponds to a CTP or CROP.   An “overlay,” 
which has a collection of locations, modifies the COP to present the view.  For instance, 
an overlay could be a unit boundary.  The boundary would have an outline, with the 
outline being a collection of locations.   The unit boundary could have properties set to 
show only unit tracks inside the boundary.  In this example, no ELINT tracks, nor any 
other track besides unit tracks, would be displayed.   
 
Figure 13.   IOS COP 
 
Figure 14 explores the concept of the Track.  The “Track” has special significance 
in the GCCS and IOS world, as it is the primary mechanism of object management in the 
COP.  Tracks are input into the COP either by manual entry at an IOS client or by 
detection by a sensor.  A sensing is called a contact, which contains information about the 
Track and a position report at a given point in time.  As shown in the figure, in IOS a 
track contains a collection of contacts.  In this diagram, only the tracks relevant to ground 




Figure 14.   IOS Track Class. 
 
The following Table lists all the major Track types defined in IOS, and their 
primary use.  The first column, “Track identifier,” is a one-character code located at the 
first position in the Track Identification number (Track ID).  The Track ID is used on the 
local machine to identify tracks.  [CHBK95, 24].  The alert reader will notice that there 
are several inclusive Track identification schemes at work in the track classification 
scheme.  Indeed, a track can have several different sources of contact information.  For 
instance, a ground unit can have an ELINT or COMINT hit, but still be classified as a 
unit track.  This can be a source of confusion.  Further, the majority of tracks on any 
particular IOS will be external, but may not be so indicated in the Tdbm.  Finally, several 
of these Track Types are for systems that are no longer deployed.  The Track ID is an 
internal number.  It does not necessarily bear any relation to the physical world object the 
track represents.  In other words, there is no independent, objective way to identify Track 
ID’s from the characteristics of the item being represented.  The one-character code may 
provide some information about the initial source of the report, and an operator can infer 
from the sensor what type of object it is.  This ambiguity about the Track ID is a 







Track Identifier  Track Type Purpose 
A Ambiguity Track doesn’t fit one of the other 
classes. 
B Acoustic Produced from Acoustic sensors. 
C Special Intelligence/Comint Produced from classified sensors. 
E Emitter/ELINT Produced from classified sensors. 
F Submarine Fire Control 
Systems (FCS) 
Produced from Submarine FCS 
sensors. 
L Link-11, Link-14, Link-16  Produced or received from Tactical 
Data links. 
N Near Real-Time Produced from classified sensors. 
R RAYCAS(V) Produced by a Raytheon shipboard 
Radar, first introduced in 1981. 
S SPA-25(G) Produced by the SPA-25(G) radar 
sensor. 
T Platform Represents a ship. 
U Unit Represents a ground unit. 
X External Received from an external source. 
Table 10.     IOS Track types.  (After [CHBK98, 24-26]). 
The preceding diagrams and discussion may have given the reader the impression 
that the COP is static.  However, the COP is being updated all the time, from every 
sensor that feeds the system.  Yet the processes that make that happen are in the 
background, other than for the “TOP COP,” who is charged with ensuring the COP is 
consistent given all current data.  While it is not static, the COP as implemented on IOS 
is an information source rather than a decisonmaker, in that it provides information to the 
commander for him to act.  In terms of the OODA loop, IOS doesn’t “Decide” on the 
data, it only supports the commander in deciding and acting.  This paradigm is different 
than that of AFATDS, which in “automated” modes will cause ammunition to fly 
downrange without human intervention.   
 
6. Interoperability Requirements 
Interoperability requirements were listed in the TCO ORD and COE in 1995.  
Specifically, these documents enumerate a requirement for TCO to be interoperable with 
all the DoD communication protocols and message formats then current.  These 
communication standards include Over-The-Horizon – Gold (OTH-Gold) messaging, 
TCP/IP, and Ethernet for Local Area Network communications.  The ORD also requires 
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interoperability with several named systems, to include AFATDS, IAS, JMCIS, the 
DACT, and GCCS.  Again, “interoperability” is not defined.  At least one Program 
Officer has interpreted “interoperability” to mean “Can exchange one or more bytes of 
information.4”  [KUBI01]  This inadequate definition of critical interoperability 
requirements has led to inadequate implementation. 
At this point, IOS is the de-facto “build-to” Marine Corps tactical system, known 
as the System of Record (despite receiving all funding from the TCO and IAS programs).  
IOS has reached its current stage via evolution.  As a consequence, the IOS is the system 
to which other systems must interface, not the other way around.  Since IOS has the 
Unified Build and a standard set of API’s, other system developers, such as those on the 
AFATDS project, have specified the AFATDS/IOS interface.  Further, middleware 
vendors can write software that interfaces with a given version of IOS and can expect to 
have a reasonable amount of success – until either the IOS or other system version 
changes.   Version changes happen about every eighteen months, while “patches” (minor 
software fixes) occur more frequently.     
 
C. IOS IMPEMENTATION ISSUES 
 
1. Software Development 
IOS has no current Requirements Document, no requirement for artifacts such as 
help manuals or other documentation, and no development plan beyond what the current 
Project Officer proposes.  The Operational Requirements were originally written for TCO 
software in 1995.  With no current operational requirements document, it’s hard to hold 
system developer’s feet to the fire for not meeting requirements.  SPAWAR Charleston 
has limited history on how the software got to where it is today, and the typical answer 
for this lack of information is that the system is really “GCCS-lite” – go talk to the joint 
people.  Meanwhile, the Joint community is worried about the three different flavors of 
GCCS that they are required to interoperate with, and continually slipping back on their 
                                                 
4Captain Kubicki surmised this to be the requirement actually implemented, based on program 
decisions prior to his assignment as MARCORSYSCOM AFATDS project officer in 1999.   
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timelines for producing version GCCS 4.x (originally slated for release in 1999, and still 
not released.)   However, based on reports from the Fleet Marine Force, IOS is a 
successful system in that it meets the requirements of the Use Cases presented above.  
The evolutionary strategy of combining software programs is a valid one for the Marine 
Corps.  This permits the deployment of more capability using less hardware.   
 
2. Support to the Fleet Marine Forces 
A particularly vexing problem with IOS and similar systems is their complexity 
and lack of reliability.  The requirement for extreme mobility produces cascading 
negative effects on the IOS.  Many problems stem from mobile networking issues, but 
other issues are lack of robust hardware and the inability to connect reliably over long 
distances without wires.  Second, the machines are not completely reliable.  Although 
these systems have become more reliable, and identifying an exact source of troubles is 
difficult, the response of the Fleet has been to hire “TechReps” (contractors) to care for 
the machines in the field.  While effective in the short term, this is not an optimum 
solution, because it exposes civilians to needless risks while forcing the Marine Corps to 
lose a boatspace for a combat-ready Marine.   From a contracting point of view, the more 
systems are in the field, the more contractors from the original program are needed.  In 
other words, four systems fielded results in Corps-wide costs for four contractors from 
four different companies.   
 
3. Future Capabilities 
IOS software is tied to GCCS.  Therefore future capabilities will mirror that of the 
GCCS program.  The next GCCS software version is version 4.x.  GCCS 4.x has a quite 
different internal structure from Version 3.x.  This different structure is one of the reasons 
the Initial Operational Capability date has slipped from 1999 to (possibly) early 2004.  
This version has the following planned capabilities: 
• Ensure all GCCS 3.x functionality is retained. 
• Ensure previous patches and fixes from version 3.x are supported. 
• Provide a Microsoft Windows 2000 client.   
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• Provide a Microsoft Windows “look and feel.”  This requirement decreases training 
costs. 
• Support network and remote installation. 
• Integrate an internal XML data scheme.   
Tying IOS to GCCS is an appropriate choice for a system designed to manipulate 
the COP.  IOS is DII COE level 8 compliant.  What is more important is that the Marine 
Corps accurately define the requirements for the COP at the tactical and operational 
levels of war.  The Corps must further ensure that these requirements are met not only in 
IOS, but GCCS as well.  The issue of whether the GCCS data model (i.e., the “Track” 
paradigm) is sufficient for ground combat will be dealt with in the interoperability 
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V. THE ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA 
SYSTEM (AFATDS) 
AFATDS is the digital C2 Program of Record for the fires functional area. It 
coordinates employment of ground, air, and sea based fires to support maneuver units.  
AFATDS analyzes available fire support assets and applies commander’s guidance to 
attack targets based on an optimal fire support solution.   AFATDS was designed for and 
fielded to the tactical and operational levels of the U.S. Marine Corps.  Therefore, 
AFATDS is fielded from the artillery battery to the artillery regiment and at the supported 
infantry headquarters from battalion to Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). 
AFATDS is the latest step in fire support C2.  Among the earliest uses of 
computers was the calculation of firing tables for artillery projectiles.  Nothing in these 
older systems could be considered “user-friendly,” and the artillery community learned to 
adapt the man to the machine in order to get the desired result of accurate predicted fires.  
The history of the development of fire support systems is germane to the current 




1. The Gunnery Problem 
In order to ensure accurate predicted indirect fires, five elements must be 
accounted for in the solution.  These elements are: accurate information about the 
projectile and propellant, accurate weapons information, accurate target and weapon 
locations, accurate meteorological information, and accurate computational procedures.  
From the earliest days of artillery, mastery of these five elements ensures effective fires 
on the enemy.  Early automated solutions focused on “accurate computational 
procedures,” but as systems continue to grow in power and shrink in size, automated 
systems increasingly are involved in the other four elements, which require accurate 
sensors.  These five elements together are termed “technical fire direction,” as they 
contribute to actually getting steel on target. 
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A further goal of automation is the solution of “tactical fire direction.”  Tactical 
fire direction solves the problem of fires employment and answers the questions of why 
are we firing, who will fire, what type of fires needed, and how much fires are needed for 
a given level of effect.  Tactical fire direction can be summed up as “Decide, Detect, 
Deliver, Asses (D3A).”  First, the commander decides what are his priority targets.  Then 
surveillance assets (sensors, including observers) detect those targets.  Once detected, the 
appropriate type and amount of fires for the desired effect is delivered to the target.  
Finally, the effects are assessed and the cycle is repeated if the desired effects have not 
been achieved.  Tactical fire direction requires much more information from many more 
widely dispersed sources than that needed for technical fire direction, and is the harder 
problem to solve.   
 
2. Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) 
FADAC was developed in 1959 by Autonetics, a subsidiary of North American 
Aviation, Inc.  FADAC was the first deployable digital system designed to accurately 
solve the technical fire direction problem (See Figure 15).  An operator in the Fire 
Direction Center (FDC) would enter data by using a matrix of rows and columns of 
switches, with values stored at the intersections. Meteorological data could be entered 
using punched paper tape.  Once all the data was stored (consisting of the other four 
elements of accurate predicted fires), pushing a button solved the differential equations 
for the projectile, and weapon-aiming information was displayed “in decimal form.” 
[BRLA61, 254] Apparently, the designers thought the display of decimal numbers over 
binary or hexadecimal numbers was a selling point.  
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Figure 15.   FADAC terminal.  (From [BRLA61, 254]) 
 
 FADAC relieved the artillery community of several laborious and error-
prone steps in calculating firing data, and greatly improved field artillery support in 
Vietnam. [DAST92]  Yet, FADAC left a lot to be desired.  The operator had no way to 
check for incorrect data entry, so manual methods were used as a backup to verify the 
automated solution.  There was no automated communication to the firing platform, and 
limited communication between various command and control nodes.  FADAC had no 
method for conducting Tactical Fire Direction.   FADAC was common in Army and 
Marine units from 1960-1980.   
 
3. TACFIRE 
TACFIRE (an acronym derived from TACtical FIRE direction) was developed in 
the late 1960’s by Litton Data systems as technology continued to progress.  [LITT00]  
Besides using the newest digital technologies to reduce weight, power consumption, etc., 
TACFIRE was the first system to network the various Fire Support agencies such as the 
FDC and Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC).  TACFIRE automated several of the 
manual processes for both technical and tactical fire direction.  As fires generally have to 
be cleared by the unit responsible for the area in which the fires are called, this 
automation greatly speeded the delivery of fires.  TACFIRE digitized information from 
radars and meteorological stations, again providing a direct benefit to the field artillery. 
[DAST92] TACFIRE was deployed at various levels in the Army from 1977 – 1996.   
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However, problems with TACFIRE kept the Marines from acquiring it.  
TACFIRE was a large system, straining transportation networks.  It was not designed to 
operate while moving, a critical requirement for the Marines.  TACFIRE used a 
proprietary, fixed format, character-oriented message set.5  Communications rates were 
slow - between 150-2400 bps.  Then current radios were designed to support voice 
communications. Because of the number of the TACFIRE devices deployed, other 
devices were required to conform to the TACFIRE communications standard for 
TACFIRE communications.  The Forward Observer (FO) still did not have a method of 
entering missions digitally, requiring him to use voice circuits to the battery FDC to send 
in fire missions.  Finally, although the TACFIRE interface was better than FADAC, few 
human factors were considered.   
 
4. BCS/LTACFIRE/IFSAS 
Because of its size, the Marines did not field TACFIRE.  Instead, the Marines 
acquired the Battery Computer System (BCS) and began a parallel development effort 
called the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS).  After a short 
while, the technical complexity of the Fire Support challenge became clear, and the 
Marine Corps settled for the capabilities of the BCS.  The BCS was the portion of 
TACFIRE residing at the firing batteries that solved the problem of technical fire 
direction.  The BCS calculated firing data for each gun in the battery, producing better 
target effects.  The BCS communicated digitally with other BCS computers, TACFIRE 
devices, Forward Observer devices, and the gunline.  The BCS could continue to operate 
while moving.  The prime contractor was Litton Data Systems, while Telos Corporation 
wrote the software in Ada.  The Corps also procured several handheld computers for use 
as a backup to the BCS.   
Meanwhile, in the mid eighties the Army began deploying Light TACFIRE, 
which was TACFIRE software ported to smaller hardware, for their light divisions.  
Operations in Southwest Asia were conducted with a mix of TACFIRE and LTACFIRE, 
interoperating with TACFIRE protocols over voice radios.  After Desert Storm and as 
                                                 
5 Later versions supported an improved Variable-Format Message set. [WATK02] 
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hardware continued to get cheaper and more powerful, the Army and Marine Corps 
began fielding the Interim Fire Support Automated System (IFSAS).  IFSAS was 
designed to be a stopgap C2 system until AFATDS could be fielded.  IFSAS was again 
TACFIRE software ported to a new hardware platform known as the Lightweight 
Computer Unit (LCU). 
 
5. AFATDS 
During the late 70’s, the Department of the Army began looking for a replacement 
for TACFIRE.  Specific goals were to effectively apportion limited fire support assets to 
targets, integrating the scheme of maneuver with fires to produce the largest effects on 
the enemy.  In effect, this would completely automate the tactical fire direction process.   
In 1981, the Army approved a plan to develop the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 
System, with fielding scheduled for the early 1990’s. [DAST92]  It is interesting to note 
that the Army, thinking ahead, planned so much time for AFATDS development.  Yet in 
the end, even this amount of time was insufficient for fielding.  The first version of 
AFATDS software was released in 1996.   
The initial AFATDS contract was awarded to Magnavox Electronic Systems, Fort 
Wayne, Indiana.  Development of AFATDS was anything but smooth.  The Field 
Artillery community wanted a system that would meet all the requirements of a high 
threat, target rich scenario such as the defense of NATO.  Such a defense would require 
automated tactical fire direction of a scale unseen in then current fire support systems.  
[WATK02]  Therefore, there were extensive requirements to automate the entire fire 
support problem.  Further, technology was moving along at a rapid pace, and as the Field 
Artillery community saw better emerging technologies, they wanted more capabilities.   
There were also significant design challenges.  First among the challenges was the 
marked lack of bandwidth in the tactical arena.  The majority of communications at the 
Marine Regiment and below is via FM voice radio, which is not optimal for digital 
communications.  Second, each AFATDS node is required to maintain common 
databases in order to ensure synchronization between nodes, requiring significant 
computational power and complicating replication issues.  Finally, automated fire 
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mission processing required digitized sensors and shooters in a networked environment, 
which is a significant task even with perfect communications.  One 1994 report from the 
Department of Defense Inspector General’s Office was particularly damning:   
The AFATDS program is not ready to proceed into the production and 
deployment phase of the acquisition process.  The AFATDS software to 
be deployed lacks critical capabilities necessary to fulfill user 
requirements, including communication with other user systems.  
Subsequent versions of AFATDS software, potentially capable of meeting 
user requirements, do not have a dedicated engineering and manufacturing 
and development phase to achieve production hardware and software 
configurations suitable for deployment.  As a result, the Army could spend 
$187.2 million for hardware that does not meet requirements, spend $4.6 
million for an initial operational test and evaluation that will not prove 
AFATDS ready for fielding, experience further delays in the development 
of software, field software that does not meet user requirements, and 
support two systems [IFSAS and AFATDS] to accomplish the same 
mission.  [DDIG94] 
Despite this negative assessment, the Artillery community continued to support 
AFATDS, as there was no other choice.  To help mitigate the problems mentioned above, 
the Program Manager and system developers agreed on an iterative software 
development model, instead of the waterfall model used previously.  Each iteration would 
offer more functionality than the last.  The program was also helped by advancing 
technology, both in communications systems and in the computing power available.   
Although the software versions were originally numbered starting with version 1, 
they were changed to reflect the year of expected release.  Version A96 was the first 
fielded, followed by versions A97 and A98. These versions were also delayed such that 
there is now no longer a correspondence between the version number and the year of 
issue.  Version A98 (the version shown on the display in Figure 16 below) is the fielded 
version.  Version A99, which is being fielded now, will be the first version to offer 
technical fire direction, replacing the BCS at the Firing batteries.  Despite the painful 
development history of AFATDS, the Field Artillery community has come to view 
AFATDS as an essential fire support system.   
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Figure 16.   AFATDS Workstation (From [APIC02]) 
 
B. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 For various reasons, both operational requirements and software versions change 
frequently.  The process used to list the requirements will be to list a subset of the user 
requirements derived from the version 2.1 (A99) System Segment Specification 
[FSSS00], and the U.S. Marine Operational Requirements Document [AORD00], list the 
system actors, derive the Essential Use Cases, and provide collaboration and class 
diagrams.  Operational requirements are better understood in the context of the Marine 
Corps tactical organization for combat.  For readers unfamiliar with U.S. Marine Corps 
Organization, Appendix B clarifies U.S. Marine Fire Support relationships and lists one 
scenario where AFATDS and IOS could be used.   
 
1. Selected User Requirements 
AFATDS is a complex system – the User’s manual is in four volumes with nearly 
1000 pages. [AHLP99]  Therefore, the following table provides a small but relevant 
subset of the AFATDS system requirements as articulated in Chapter 3 and Appendix I of 
the AFATDS Version 2.1 System Segment Specification. [FSSS00]  These requirements 
were selected based on relevance to the Fire Support mission.  The “requirement number” 
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listed here does not correspond to any AFATDS artifact, and is used for tracking the 




User Requirement AFATDS Process Requirement 
Number 
Communicate Digitally • Establish Communications 
• Manage Alerts 
• Autoforward Messages 
• Filter Incoming/Outgoing Messages 






Maintain Accurate Friendly 
Unit Information 
Create/Edit 
• Friendly Unit Information 
• Friendly Geometry Information  





Maintain Accurate Enemy 
Unit Information 
Create/Edit 
• Enemy Unit Information 
• Enemy Unit Geometry Information 






Battlespace Information  
Create/Edit 
• Battlefield Geometries 




Develop and Apply 
Commander’s Guidance 
(DECIDE) 
Create/Edit Guidance Data  
• Attack guidance 
• Target Guidance 
• Command and Control Guidance  






Process Combat Information 
(DETECT, ASSES) 
• Generate Targets 
• Process Targets 





Deliver Fires (DELIVER) Attack Analysis 
• Maintain Unit List 
• Determine Mission Requirements 
• Perform Geometry Checks 
• Determine Recommended Attack 
Option 
• Perform Mission Coordination 
 
Conduct Mission 
• Determine Controlling Unit 












Collect Combat Information 
(DETECT, ASSES) 
Interoperate with External Systems 
Data Distribution 








2. Actors  
In the UML, actors are the people or systems that interact with Use Cases.  In the 
military, and thus in AFATDS, the same sequence of Actors is repeated for each level of 
the military hierarchy.  For example, there is a Battalion Commander and a Regimental 
Commander.  These are specializations of the Actor Roles.  AFATDS makes distinctions 
between the various specializations when it is pertinent to completing the actions in the 
Use Cases.  Specifically, distinctions are made in the Fires Coordinator, Observer, and 
Firing Agency Roles.  The following table lists the characteristics of the principal Actors 
in the AFATDS system. 
   
Actor Role Name Description Example Instances 
Commander The commander role is that of the person 
given responsibility and authority to 
prosecute the campaign.  The commander 
sets fire support policies that are then 
encoded into AFATDS.  The commander 
expects the information and data in AFATDS 
to be correct, and looks to AFATDS for 
situational awareness of fires issues. 
 
• Battalion CO 
• Regimental CO 
• Division CO 
Fires Coordinator A member of the commander’s staff fills the 
Fires Coordinator role.  The Fires 
Coordinator is responsible for implementing 
the Commander’s policy.  He ensures that 
targets are correctly identified and assigns 
fires based on mission priorities.  He 








• Fire Direction 
Officer 
 
Observer The observer provides the sensing function 
for AFATDS.  The observer interfaces 
directly with AFATDS using a message 






equipment.  If digital equipment is not 
available, the observer can call for fire using 
voice transmission over radio, and an 
AFATDS terminal operator will enter the 
mission. 
 
Firing Agency Any asset capable of delivering ordnance. • Artillery 
Battalion 
• Mortar Platoon 
• Naval Gunfire 
Ship 
• Airplane 
Table 12.   AFATDS Actors 
 
Each actor is supported by one or more AFATDS operators, and AFATDS 
workstations are setup and maintained by AFATDS administrators.  These roles are 
critical to correct operation of AFATDS, and their interaction with the AFATDS will be 
assumed for the remainder of this document.  It is important to note that a Firing Agency 
is considered an actor because it is outside AFATDS.  However, inside AFATDS, this 
actor is modeled as a “friendly unit” object with high fidelity. 
   
3. Essential Use Cases  
Figure 17 below depicts four high-level essential Use Cases for the AFATDS 
system.  AFATDS currently fulfills the requirements of these Use Cases.  The first three 
Use Cases are modeled.   
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Figure 17.   AFATDS System Level Use Cases. 
 
The three most critical Use Cases are listed in the tables below.  These Use Cases 
fulfill the Requirements set forth in the Requirements noted above (Table 11), as noted in 
the Use Cases.    
 
USE CASE: Provide COP 
Actors: Commander, Fires Coordinator, Firing Unit, Observer 
Purpose: Use AFATDS to accurately model the Operational Area. 
Overview: This Use Case describes the steps necessary to prepare 
AFATDS for use by establishing the tactical database.  Prior to 
entering this Use Case, AFATDS station communications 
hardware must be set up.      
Type: Primary and Essential 
Cross References: R1.1-1.4, R2.1-2.3, R3.1-3.3, R4.1-4.3 
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This Use Case is initiated when a 
particular AFATDS workstation is turned on.  
 
 2.  The first AFATDS powered on in an 
Operating Facility (OPFAC) becomes the 
master AFATDS. AFATDS loads the 
previously stored OPFAC configuration 
and databases.   
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3. The operator verifies the previously stored 
OPFAC configuration or changes the data if 
needed.   The operator chooses the role of 
this particular OPFAC from the following 
menu: FSE/FSCC; FA CP/FDC; FU (Firing 
Unit); IUC (Independent User Center). 
 
 4.  AFATDS takes the new configuration 
data.  AFATDS loads the appropriate 
software to meet the requirements of the 
chosen role.  If the role selected is IUC, 
AFATDS loads only a portion of program 
software.  
5.  The operator edits the Master Unit List 
(MUL), if desired.  The MUL is the listing of 
all friendly units in the theater that have the 
capability to communicate with AFATDS, 
whether they are AFATDS machines or 
machines designed to interface with 
AFATDS.  The MUL contains unit names 
along with their identifying information and 
communications parameters.   
 
 6.  AFATDS changes the MUL. 
7.  The operator enters the authorized system 
users.  
 
 8.  At this point, the AFATDS master 
station allows other AFATDS 
workstations to power up.  AFATDS 
allows other users to login.   
9.  The operator assigns one or more duties 
to that particular AFATDS machine from the 
following menu:  System Administrator, 
Communications Administrator, Message 
Monitor, Mission monitor.  The operator 
creates communications and distribution lists 
that meet the requirements of the tactical 
scenario.  The operator enters friendly unit 
information of the units controlled by that 
OPFAC.   
 
 10.  Each AFATDS assumes the duties 
required.  The AFATDS OPFAC gleans 
information about higher, adjacent, 
supporting, and supported unit 
relationships based on the operator 
entries.   
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11.  The AFATDS operator enters 
geographic information and battlefield and 
enemy data as needed to update the common 
operational picture. 
 
 12.  AFATDS takes this data and 
correlates it with other incoming COP 
data from other Operating Facilities.  
Friendly data is correlated using the 
MUL.  AFATDS data is shadowed as 
necessary between master and slave 
workstations in the same OPFAC.  
AFATDS displays a view of the COP 
when requested.  The user can change the 
view by filtering the data.   
ALTERNATE Courses: 
Step 1:  If an AFATDS machine is not the first powered on in an OPFAC, it becomes a 
slave machine and AFATDS automatically shadows databases.  Slave machines cannot 
edit the MUL or perform other system administration functions. Slave machines can 
execute steps 1 and 8-12 of this Use Case. 
Step 3:  If the AFATDS operator changes the unit information, AFATDS loads a default 
database.  This can cause significant disruption if the operator expected all other tactical 
data to remain the same.  
Step 5.  The MUL must be the same across all AFATDS at all OPFACs.  The AFATDS 
developers recommend that only one unit (the senior unit) modify the MUL and that all 
other AFATDS units import that MUL from a disk. 






















USE CASE: Define Fire Mission Criteria 
Actors: Commander, Fires Coordinator 
Purpose: Prepare AFATDS to automatically process fire missions 
Overview: This Use Case describes the steps necessary to prepare 
AFATDS for mission processing by establishing 
Commander’s Guidance.  Prior to entering this Use Case, an 
AFATDS workstation must be initialized as described in the 
Use Case “Provide COP.”  In particular, the MUL must match 
among all AFATDS stations.  Further, the AFATDS role must 
be defined. 
Type: Primary and Essential 
Cross References: R4.1-4.4, R7.1-7.2 
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This Use Case is initiated when the 
Commander defines Fire Mission Criteria.  
These criteria are stated in the form of fire 
mission processing rules and Commander’s 
guidance for fires.  Typical guidance 
includes fire mission type priorities and 
targeting priorities by target class (i.e., fire 
on threat C2 nodes immediately when 
identified but don’t shoot supply sites).  The 
operator enters this information into 
AFATDS. 
 
 2.  AFATDS takes the data as guidances 
and rules, and stores it into multiple 
“mission selection criteria” data tables.   
3. The operator enters types and locations of 
friendly fire support units.  The Fire Support 
Coordinator enters amounts and types of 
ammunition available by unit. 
 
 4.  AFATDS takes the data and stores it 
into multiple “firing unit” tables.   
5.  The operator defines battlespace 
geometry in terms of restrictive and 
permissive FSCM’s, by location.   
 
 6.  AFATDS takes the data.  During the 
Use Case “Conduct Fire Mission”, it will 
check the target grid against this data for 
possible violations of geometry 
constraints. 
7.  The operator enters all current observer 
locations.  The operator defines how 
observers will connect to the AFATDS 
network.   
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 8.  AFATDS takes the data and stores it 
for use.  Observers are treated as units by 
AFATDS.   
ALTERNATE Courses: 
Step 4:  If other AFATDS OPFACs have unit information, after a communications path 
has been established, the OPFACs will update unit information between them.  This 
includes information about location and ammunition available.     
Table 14.    Essential Use Case – Define Fire Mission Criteria. (AFATDS) 
 
 
USE CASE: Conduct Fire Mission 
Actors: Observer, Fires Coordinator, Firing Unit 
Purpose: Deliver fires on targets. 
Overview: This Use Case describes the steps necessary for AFATDS to 
deliver fires on targets of opportunity.  This Use Case 
describes the primary functionality of AFATDS.   
Type: Primary and Essential 
Cross References: R1.1-1,3, R2.1-2.3 R5.1-5.3, R6.1-6.7, R7.1-7.2 
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This Use Case is initiated when an 
Observer calls for fire using a digital device. 
The observer has a wide range of choices. 
He chooses to call a “Fire For Effect-When 
Ready” mission.  This means that the firing 
battery is responsible for firing when it is 
ready, not at any command of the observer.   
 
 2.  The receiving AFATDS OPFAC 
verifies validity of the Call for Fire Grid 
and other data.  AFATDS assigns a target 
number to the target.  AFATDS compares 
the “suspect target” to target selection 
standards and determines attack 
precedence.  AFATDS filters the target, 
checking for target duplication. AFATDS 
routes the Call for Fire to a Fires 
Coordinator OPFAC based on target 
location and other properties.     
3. The Fires Coordinator checks the target 
location against known friendly locations 
and other parameters.  The Fires Coordinator 
AFATDS system approves or denies the Call 
for Fire.   
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 4.  AFATDS determines which unit can 
range the target, has the appropriate 
ammunition, and is available for missions. 
AFATDS sends the mission to that Firing 
Unit.  AFATDS sends a message to 
observer telling the Observer what to 
expect from which Firing Unit.     
5.  The Observer acknowledges receipt of 
the message to observer.     
 
6.  The Firing Unit acknowledges receipt of 
the mission.   
 
 7.  The Firing Unit AFATDS process the 
Fire Mission by conducting technical Fire 
Direction and sending the appropriate 
commands to the gunline.  The guns fire. 
8.  The observer observes the effects on the 
target and ends the mission.  The observer 
sends a message containing tactical 
intelligence about the effects on the target. 
 
 9.  AFATDS sends an End of Mission 
message to the Fires Coordinator and the 
Firing Unit.  AFATDS saves the tactical 
intelligence from the mission and updates 
the COP.  AFATDS updates the Firing 
Unit information by decrementing the 
amount of ordnance expended from the 
Firing Unit.   
ALTERNATE Courses: 
Step 1:  If the observer doesn’t have a digital device or loses digital connectivity, the 
observer will use voice transmission to reach the appropriate AFATDS operator, who 
will enter the mission into AFATDS.  In either case, the AFATDS processing steps are 
the same.   
Step 3:  This step can be done automatically or manually.  Current USMC practice is to 
have a “man in the loop,” so this check is shown as an Actor action, with communication 
via the AFATDS system.    
Step 4:  If the Mission is Denied, AFATDS sends a Message to observer stating that, and 
saves the target for later processing or analysis. 
Step 8:  The Observer can choose to adjust the fall of shot based on demonstrated lack of 
effect on the target, or can repeat the mission if more effects are needed.  In these cases, 
processing loops to step 4.   







4. AFATDS Network 
AFATDS meets the requirements listed above using a system network overlaid on 
the military Fire Support Structure (see Appendix B for an example scenario).  From the 
perspective of any OPFAC, the OPFAC has relationships with higher, adjacent, 
supporting, and supported nodes.  These roles are not required to be filled (the highest 
node has no “higher” relationship), but when filled, define what messages are sent and 
when they are sent.  Although AFATDS is truly a “Fire Support” system, it has 
traditionally been viewed as an artillery-specific system, and therefore artillery serves as 
the example agent providing fires.  Typical OPFACS are the infantry Regimental COC 
and the Artillery Battalion FDC.  Figure 18 below shows the AFATDS logical network 
that would be used for the scenario listed in Appendix B.  Using this example, there are 9 
FO teams, 3 Infantry Battalion FSCC’s, one artillery Battalion FDC, and three battery 
FDC’s.   
 






5. Derived AFATDS Classes 
Recall from chapter III, a Class is the term for objects that share the same 
characteristics.  For example, FriendlyUnit is a class, while a particular friendly unit (say 
3rd Battalion 11th Marines) is an object (also called an Instantiation) in the class.  Classes 
can have attributes and methods, where attributes describe objects and methods are the 
activities that the class participates in.  In AFATDS software, class attributes are the row 
and column names stored in a relational database, while the values of a given attribute are 
stored at the intersection of the rows and columns in the database.  Methods are not 
explicitly given to classes, since AFATDS was originally not designed using object 
orientation.  The purpose of using classes to describe AFATDS is that it allows a more 
explicit picture of the order of operations to be derived in the sequence diagrams that 
follow.  The following diagrams graphically depict the classes derived from the Use 
Cases above.  
Diagrams 19 and 20 below depict Classes involved in the Use Case “Provide 
COP.”  Of note on these diagrams is the change in an AFATDS workstation to an 
AFATDS OPFAC while powering up.  This change limits functionality while preparing 
the AFATDS to perform the appropriate OPFAC role in mission processing.  Next, in 
AFATDS, an Enemy Unit is a separate concept from a target.  In fact, a target can be any 
location or set of locations, no matter what is actually there.  A Suspect Target is 
unprocessed, incompletely specified, or found not to meet target selection standards.  
Also note that in AFATDS, a geometry is 30 or fewer locations.   
Enemy units are processed and viewed differently than friendly units, and Firing 
units contain significantly more information than other units in order for AFATDS to 
pick an appropriate firing unit, manage Firing Unit ammunition, and control movement.   
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Figure 19.   AFATDS OPFAC Class 
 
 
Figure 20.   AFATDS Provide COP 
 
The new concepts of guidance introduced in the Use Case “Define Fire Mission 
Criteria” are shown in Figure 21.    In AFATDS there are actually 6 different types of 
guidance, but these three are the ones most used for mission processing.  Important 
concepts here are that AFATDS processes fires for all types of Fire Support Assets, and 
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that attack guidance is contained in the FS_Atk_Guidance (“FS” stands for Fire Support).  
FA_Atk_Guidance represents Field Artillery specific attack guidance, while 
Target_Guidance provides the criteria for target processing.  In the D3A cycle, target 
selection and processing is the key element in ensuring the Commander’s Intent for fires 
is met.    
 
Figure 21.   AFATDS Guidance Classes 
 
The final Use Case, “Conduct Fire Mission,” does not introduce any new classes.  
It will be treated in the next section using a UML Sequence Diagram.    
 
6. Use Case “Conduct Fire Mission” Sequence Diagram 
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As discussed in the UML Chapter, a UML sequence diagram emphasizes the 
actions a system takes to accomplish a task.  The sequence of interactions between 
objects establishes a clear timeline.  Although events may occur concurrently, event start 
and end times are explicit.  The Use Case “Conduct Fire Mission” is a prime candidate 
for this treatment.  No new classes are introduced.  In a sequence diagram, Actors are 
represented outside the system boundary, while objects (not classes) are inside the system 
boundary.  In this Use Case, the “system” is the complete AFATDS network.  The 
pertinent actors are the observer and the Firing Agency.  To simplify the Use Case, we 
will assume that no operator intervention criteria have been set, i.e., AFATDS is in 
automatic processing mode.  The Fires Coordinator and Commander both have 
contributed to the COP and guidance, but their actions are performed by AFATDS when 
AFATDS processes missions automatically.  
 
Figure 22.   Use Case “Conduct Fire Mission” Sequence Diagram 
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The observer starts the action by sending a Fire Mission on a Suspect Target.  The 
FSCCRole AFATDS processes the mission using the guidances indicated in the note in 
the Figure.  Processing is fast – usually a few milliseconds up to a second.  When the 
Suspect Target is approved, it becomes a Target, and the FSCCRole AFATDS sends a 
fire mission to the FDCRole AFATDS with the target data.  The FDCRole AFATDS 
sends an “Order to Fire” to the FiringAgencyRole AFATDS at the Firing Unit (note the 
firing unit is outside the system boundary to the right).    The FiringAgencyRole 
AFATDS sends fire commands down to the gunline.  The FiringAgencyRole AFATDS 
sends a message back to the observer telling him what to expect (number of rounds, 
target number, and other information).  This message is repeated through the network 
back to the observer.  The “Ready,” “Shot,” and “Rounds Complete” messages are 
internal to the firing agency processing with the FiringAgencyRole AFATDS, but the 
guns are firing.  The observer sees the fall of the rounds, and decides to end the mission.  
The “End of Mission” message he sends is echoed throughout the AFATDS network, and 
mission processing is complete.   The Firing Unit sends a “Ready” message back to the 
AFATDS network, signifying readiness for further missions.   
 
C. INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
1. Overview 
When AFATDS was being developed in the 1980’s, the biggest interoperability 
concern was with legacy systems such as IFSAS and TACFIRE.  The majority of ORD 
interoperability requirements addresses these fire support-specific systems.  In the 
1980’s, AFATDS was the cutting-edge in the ground C2 arena, and other C2 systems 
were either undergoing testing or still being designed.  Like AFATDS, each system was 
being designed in a “stovepiped” fashion by sponsors that did not have a military-wide 
view.  In the face of this confusion, the Marine AFATDS ORD writers stated: 
AFATDS must interoperate with all MAGTF Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence tactical data systems. 
 These systems include, but are not limited to the Intelligence Analysis 
System, Improved Direct Air Support Center, Tactical Combat 
Operations, Position Location Reporting System, Target Location 
Designation Hand-off System, and the Contingency Theater Automated 
Planning System. [AORD00, 2] 
Two of these systems have been superceded (Tactical Combat Operations and the 
Position Location Reporting System), and one has never been deployed (the Target 
Location Designation Handoff System.) The ORD covers a lot of systems and a lot of 
ground, and uses the buzzword “interoperate,” but what “interoperate” means is never 
defined here or in any other requirements documents.  As far as USMC systems were 
concerned, the AFATDS designers were left with no systems with which to test 
interoperability and no proper guidance on what interoperability meant. 
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 2. Interface Control Documents  
Despite the vague ORD, the military acquisition system has a documentation 
system in place for interfaces.  In accordance with this system, the AFATDS program 
office requires the developer to publish Interface Control Documents, called ICD’s.  
There is one general ICD volume that defines the methodology of AFATDS interface 
design, and then an ICD is published for each major system that AFATDS must interface 
with.  The systems for which the ICD’s are written are listed in the System Segment 
Specification paragraph 3.2.3.  The System Segment Specification lists no fewer than 13 
separate interface protocols that AFATDS must comply with, and no fewer than 29 
separate systems that AFATDS must interface with.  The Intelligence-Operations System 
(IOS) is not listed, although both JMCIS and GCCS are listed.  The GCCS mentioned in 
the ICD is GCCS -Army, while JMCIS has transitioned to GCCS-M.   
The ICD’s list the type of messages that must be transmitted between systems, 
and outlines out what will happen with each message in terms of needed operator 
intervention to add information or ensure information is not lost.  Now imagine that a 
particular OPFAC has thirty messages arrive an hour – a fairly low rate.  If an operator is 
required to monitor and add information to each message, the chances for error are high.  
ICD’s are an important item for interoperability, but any processing requiring manual 
steps is unacceptable.   
 
3. DII-COE Compliance Requirements 
AFATDS is certified by the Army6 to be at DII COE compliance level 6, with 
waivers for some items, and some items having met a slightly higher compliance level. 
Recall from the discussion of the DII COE compliance chart that true compliance is not 
achieved until level 7, with full compliance being level 8.  Raytheon is working 
feverishly to become fully DII COE compliant, and in fact plans on full compliance by 
the release of GCCS Version 4.x, which was originally expected in late 1999, but hasn’t 
                                                 
6 As with the other services and their systems, the Army has been delegated the authority to certify its 
own system by JITC.  This is an automatic conflict of interest. [WATK02] 
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yet been released.  Further, AFATDS has implemented some joint segment software that 
improves the COP.  Specifically, AFATDS has added NIMA’s Joint Mapping Toolkit 
(JMTK) to version A99, released this year to the Marine Corps.  These efforts drive a 
continuing need for AFATDS program funding.   
 
D. AFATDS IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
 
1. The Master Unit List 
The Use Cases listed above gave some indication of the importance of the Master 
Unit List.  The MUL contains the base data upon which all AFATDS operations depend.  
The MUL is a listing of all friendly units in a theater.  The MUL can contain up to 32766 
units.  If a unit is not listed in the MUL, AFATDS cannot process information to or from 
that unit.   The MUL must be the same between all AFATDS workstations at all 
OPFACS on the active network.  Information stored in the MUL is different than that 
stored in a friendly unit, but the two are tied together when friendly unit information is 
entered.   
In AFATDS, a target is not an enemy unit.  A target is any point on the ground 
along with a detailed description of what is there to be hit.  In fact, the fire support 
community may target hilltops and road junctions “just in case” there is an enemy force 
there later.  In automated mode, AFATDS chooses whether to shoot such targets based on 
the Commander’s Target Selection Criteria.  Also, an enemy unit is not necessarily a 
target.  These targeting and enemy concepts are often at odds with objects of the same 
name in other C2 systems.  Again, semantic confusion is introduced into the 
interoperability equation.  
AFATDS Version A98 data is stored in a relational database called InterBase, 
from Borland International. ([GCNS95] & [FSSS00, 18]).  However, AFATDS is 
primarily developed by the U.S. Army, who several years ago mandated that all its 
systems would use the “Joint Common Database” (JCDB).  The JCDB is an Informix 
database designed by the Army to support their Army Battlefield Command System, a 
collection of C2 systems.  The JCDB is used by the Army (principally in GCCS-A), and 
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it is neither joint across services, nor is it used by all Army systems.  However, AFATDS 
is required to exchange certain classes of information with the JCDB.  AFATDS Version 
A99 implements the JCDB.   
 
2. Current Capabilities 
AFATDS does what it was designed to do.  It is particularly suited for the Marine 
Division and below.  The artillerymen in the artillery regiment and below have become 
duty experts.  Here, fire mission processing is a daily requirement and the AFATDS 
operators and support staff have the most familiarity with this complex system.  
However, above the division level there are major concerns with AFATDS.  These 
concerns stem from the inability of AFATDS to interface with other command and 
control systems.  In particular, MEF staffs are concerned that the one system that “makes 
decisions” (AFATDS) does not contain the same data as their other Command and 
Control Systems, which display the Common Operational Picture.  Any shadow of doubt 
about correct data in the AFATDS COP will put AFATDS mission-processing into 
manual mode, thereby negating the benefits of automating fires in the first place.   
Finally, the technical fire control modules of AFATDS (fielded in version A99) 
have just been fielded to the Artillery batteries, and the early reports are not yet in about 
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VI. INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of all Command and Control Systems is to build situational awareness.  
AFATDS and IOS build situational awareness when they present the same data to the 
commanders in ways that compliment his understanding of the battlefield.  Conversely, 
the more the AFATDS and IOS battlefield informational representations diverge, the 
greater the loss of situational awareness.  The battlefield is complicated enough without 
the negative effects of having different systems presenting different information.  This 
chapter analyzes two primary operator tasks that require the interoperability of these two 
systems.   
Solving interoperability issues requires system designers to decide “who owns the 
data.”  “Owning the data” means the system in question is the authoritative source for 
that type of data.  In the AFATDS/IOS interface, this question is important because both 
systems do different things with the data.  AFATDS uses high fidelity data to 
automatically process targets and shoot, while IOS data is of lower fidelity but is more 
widely shared across the organization.  A logical division of data would be for AFATDS 
to “own” fires data, while IOS “owns” COP data.   If this delineation is articulated early, 
it helps the engineers correctly apportion responsibilities and develop communications 
that support the decision.   
When two systems become interoperable, collaboratively working to meet the 
same goals, the systems are federated.  The collection of collaborating systems is known 
as a federation.  There are three ways that fielded systems can become federated.  Either 
one or both systems hardware can change, the software can change, or the organization 
can develop workarounds.  Generally, the organization will develop workarounds on the 
spot to resolve system differences.  These changes to techniques and procedures are often 
dangerous in practice because they are ad-hoc and don’t affect the underlying 
incompatibilities.  The advantage however, is that the organization has complete control 
of their workarounds.   
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Software has the advantage of being malleable, and is often preferred over 
hardware integration.  Software integration options are to change one or both systems 
software interfaces, or add middleware that serves as a translator between the systems. 
The addition of middleware can be either in the form of “wrappers” that surround the 
target system interfaces, or separate system translators that convert data in between 
systems.  Changing system interfaces means modifying legacy code, which is expertise-
intensive and expensive.  Adding middleware (such as wrappers and translators) is often 
seen as easier but has added problems in getting the translation correct and added 
overhead in terms of time to make the various translations.  Signifcant work has been 
done in this area by NPS students.  Captain Paul Young, USN, has developed the 
Federation of Independent Objects Model (FIOM) as a part of his PhD dissertation.  The 
FIOM implements translator middleware using XML, XSLT, and automated methods to 
integrate legacy systems. [YOUN02]  
   
B. LISI-IMM 
When evaluating the proper course of action to take in integrating systems, it is 
useful to state the degree of interoperability that exists between two systems and the 
degree of interoperability desired.  The Department of Defense has adopted the Levels of 
Information System Interoperability – Interoperability Maturity Model (LISI-IMM)  
[LISI98] to define inter-system interoperability.  The advantage of using this formal 
interoperability evaluation method is that it evaluates all areas of interoperability in terms 
of specific and agreed upon interoperability goals.  
The LISI-IMM evaluates systems interoperability in terms of the four attributes of 
Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and Data (referred to as PAID).   The following 






Attribute Definition Examples 
Procedures Policies, standards, and guidance 
leading to the development and 
deployment of the system(s). 
• Security Policy 
• Operating Policy 
• Workarounds 
Applications Software that enables the system to 
meet its mission.     
• AFATDS Target 
Selection Standards 
module 
• IOS Joint Mapping 
Toolkit  
Infrastructure Items that support a physical and 
logical connection between systems.  
This includes system services.  
• Protocol stacks 
• Network hardware 
• Operating System 
Services 
Data Information Processed by the System to 
meet the needs of the applications.  
Data includes both semantic and 
syntactic data.   
• IOS Track 
• AFATDS Unit 
• IOS Overlay 
• AFATDS Boundary 
Table 16.   LISI-IMM Attributes (After [LISI98, 2-8]). 
 
There are five levels of interoperability, ranging from the lowest level of zero to 
the highest of five.   The characteristics of each level are listed below: [LISI98, 2-6] 
• Level 0: Isolated Interoperability in a Manual Environment    
Level 0 describes isolated, standalone systems.  No direct electronic connection is 
allowed or is available, so the only interface between these systems is by manual 
re-keying or via extractable, common media (i.e., disk). Fusion of information, if 
any, is done off-line by the individual decisionmaker by other automated means.   
• Level 1:  Connected Interoperability in a Peer-to-Peer Environment 
Systems that are capable of being linked electronically and providing some form 
of simple electronic exchanges. These systems have a limited capacity, generally 
passing homogeneous data types, such as voice, simple “text” e-mail, or fixed 
graphic files such as GIF or TIFF images between workstations. They allow 
decision-makers to exchange one-dimensional information but have little 
capability to fuse information together to support decision-making. 
• Level 2:  Functional Interoperability in a Distributed Environment  
Systems reside on local networks that allow data sets to be passed from system to 
system. They provide for increasingly complex media exchanges. Formal data 
models (logical and physical) are present. Generally, however, only the logical 
data model is accepted across programs and each program defines its own 
physical data model. Data is generally heterogeneous and may contain 
information from many simple formats fused together, such as an image with an 
annotated overlay. Decision-makers are able to share fused information between 
systems or functions. 
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• Level 3:  Domain-Based Interoperability in an Integrated Environment   
Systems are capable of being connected via wide area networks (WANs) that 
allow multiple users to access data. Information at this level is shared between 
independent applications. A domain-based data model is present (logical and 
physical) that is understood, accepted, and implemented across a functional area 
or group of organizations that comprises a domain. Using agreed-upon domain 
data models, systems must now be capable of implementing business rules and 
processes to facilitate direct database-to-data-base interactions, such as those 
required to support database replication servers. Individual applications at this 
level may share central or distributed data repositories. Systems at this level 
support group collaboration on fused information products. Decision-making is 
supported by fused information from a localized domain. 
• Level 4:  Enterprise-Based Interoperability in a Universal Environment 
Systems are capable of operating using a distributed global information space 
across multiple domains. Multiple users can access and interact with complex data 
simultaneously.  Data and applications are fully shared and can be distributed 
throughout this space to support information fusion. Advanced forms of 
collaboration (the virtual office concept) are possible. Data has a common 
interpretation regardless of form, and applies across the entire enterprise. The 
need for redundant, functionally equivalent applications is diminished since 
applications can be shared as readily as data at this level. Decision-making takes 
place in the context of, and is facilitated by, enterprise-wide information found in 
this global information space. 
                                   
The AFATDS/IOS interface is at LISI-IMM level two.  They do not share the 
domain-based data model required for systems to be judged at level 3.  Level 2 
interoperability is not acceptable.  The user requirements drive the need for the shared 
data model given at level 3.   
 
C. USER REQUIREMENTS  
 
1. Requirements 
There are two critical requirements.  The first is for both systems to provide the 
same COP.  The Marine Corps wants both systems to provide the same COP, so that if 
one system shows a unit, the other system knows about the same unit at the same place 
and at the same time.  (Recalling the discussion of a view, the second system may not 
display the same unit, but must know about it.)   
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The second requirement is to conduct fire missions.  The Marine Corps wants to 
use the IOS (and IOS clients such as C2PC) to Conduct Fire Missions via AFATDS, and 
get the same results as if the IOS was an AFATDS observer.   This includes updating the 
IOS COP to show the effects of the mission.    
 
2. Actors 
The Actors required for the interoperability Use Cases are the union of the Actors 
required for each individual system.  When analyzing the missions of each system along 
with the Actors, it becomes clear that the differences between the actors conform to real-
world differences in missions.  So, one cannot make the “Fires Coordinator” actor a 
member of staff, because the Fires Coordinator has a critical role in preventing fratricide, 
and that role is differentiated from that of Staff.  The following table lists all the actors in 
the interoperability effort. 
Actor Role Name Description Example Instances 
Commander The Commander has the same role in both  
IOS and AFATDS.   
 
• Battalion CO 
• Regimental CO 
• Division CO 
Staff A member of the commander’s staff fills the 
staff role.  The staff is responsible for 
implementing the Commander’s policy.  
Staff provides human oversight of the COP.  
At least one member of the Staff serves as 
the COP Track Correlator (The “TOP 
COP.”) 





Fires Coordinator The specific role important to the 
interoperability of the two systems is the role 
that checks fire missions against the 









Sensor The sensor provides the sensing function.  
The sensor can be any human or digital 
information provider.  In an interoperable 
scenario, the sensor is often a Forward 









Friendly Unit Any unit so designated by the Commander, 
whether he controls them or not.  (Adjacent 
units may not be under control, but still have 





• Mortar Platoon 
• Airplane 
Table 17.   IOS/AFATDS Federation Actors. 
 
3. Provide COP 
AFATDS and IOS must present the commander views of the same COP.  In order 
to achieve this, there must be a common representation of objects between systems.  An 
example of the utility of sharing the same COP would be the ability of a C2PC operator 
to enter a fire support coordination measure that was accepted and used by the AFATDS 
network, removing the requirement for staff to switch to an AFATDS terminal every time 
they needed to change a fire support graphic.  Given the COP Use Cases for each system, 




Both systems share the same organizational procedures since they both support 
the Marine Corps “business rules.”  The Business rules are the sum of Marine 
warfighting doctrine.  The COP is developed in accordance with the COP handbook, a 
statement of the business rules.  Differences in operational procedures are attributable to 
differences in system design, and are not significant.  There are no hindrances to 
interoperability from a procedural standpoint. 
 
• Applications 
System applications differ because of the different missions each system has.  
This heterogeneity in applications is required to support the commander and the 
functional warfare areas.  In terms of the COP, however, there is no reason why both 
systems can’t share the same applications.  This is beginning to occur.  For example, the 
Joint Mapping Toolkit (JMTK), a segment for manipulating mapping products and 
produced by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to run on DII COE 
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platforms, has been added to AFATDS A99 software.  IOS has had the JMTK since its 
inception.  This commonality across applications is one step toward interoperability.   
 
• Infrastructure 
For these systems, infrastructure can be correlated to meeting the requirements of 
the DII COE model.  IOS is level 8 DII COE compliant, while AFATDS is (self-
evaluated) level 6 DII COE compliant, with some processes waivered.  The waivers are 
given by the service chief for those items that cannot easily be made DII COE compliant.  
Clearly, AFATDS must become fully DII COE compliant to help ensure interoperability.  
It must be stressed that DII COE compliance only affects the Infrastructure portion of the 
interoperability requirement.  Further, DII COE compliance may become obsolete in the 
future, while the requirement for common infrastructure remains.   Common 
infrastructure must be mandated from organizations outside and above the system 
developer.   
 
• Data 
System data is the big issue. IOS and AFATDS have widely different data 
models, developed for different but related purposes.  Each system models the battlefield 
differently, and there is no common data representation between them.  For example, a 
friendly firing unit is modeled to great detail in AFATDS in order to meet the goals of 
ammunition tracking and producing firing data.  Meanwhile, the same unit is represented 
in IOS as a unit track, with a course and speed and other non-actionable data.  There is no 
reliable automated way to convert Tracks to Units and vice versa.   
Another question is what should be shared.  At a minimum, the IOS and AFATDS 
must have a method of identifying the same object to each other when the two systems 
communicate.  If a friendly firing unit is sent from the IOS to AFATDS, human 
intervention is required to enter all the data that the IOS doesn’t contain that the 
AFATDS needs to properly process missions.  The Track/Unit issue is the example, but 
most other objects have the same or more complicated issues.  The common, shared data 
model is the primary obstacle to federation COP interoperability.       
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4. Use Case Conduct Fire Mission 
The second critical requirement for Marines is to be able to use an IOS client to 
call for fire.  This presents some interesting organizational issues.  Primary among them 
is authenticating the IOS client as having the authority to initiate fires.  For instance, one 
doesn’t want someone thirty miles from the front calling for fire when he has no way of 
controlling the effects.  Generally, only people (or sensors) that can observe the effects of 
the fires are permitted to call for fire.  Also, there are most always area restrictions – a 
Forward Observer is expected to call for fire in an assigned zone, for example.  Yet these 
are organizational issues for which there are organizational answers that the Marine 
Corps can work out.  The point is a C2PC cannot be used to call for fire right now 
(without help from middleware)7.   The following Use Case and sequence diagram 
represents a proposed usage of the federation. 
   
USE CASE: Conduct Fire Mission with IOS Client 
Actors: Observer, Fires Coordinator, Firing Unit 
Purpose: Deliver fires on targets. 
Overview: This Use Case describes the steps necessary for AFATDS to 
deliver fires on targets of opportunity with an IOS Client 
acting as the observer.   
Type: Interoperability 
Cross References: R1.1-1,3, R2.1-2.3 R5.1-5.3, R6.1-6.7, R7.1-7.2 
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This Use Case is initiated when an IOS 
Client (observer) calls for fire.  The IOS 
sends it to the AFATDS in the OPFAC 
(which is the COC), and the IOS.  The 
message includes the address of the IOS.   
 
 2.  The IOS server identifies the message 
as a request for fire and records the fire 
Mission grid for COP purposes.  The IOS 
waits for a target number from the 
AFATDS.  Until a target number is 
assigned, correlation of the IOS target and 
AFATDS target is by grid coordinate and 
sender.       
                                                 
7 Middleware (The Fire Support Client) has been developed to do part of this.  It is covered in the next 
chapter.   
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 3.  The AFATDS OPFAC verifies validity 
of the Call for Fire Grid and other data.  
AFATDS assigns a target number to the 
target and sends it to the IOS Client and 
IOS.  AFATDS compares the suspect 
target to target selection standards and 
determines attack precedence.  AFATDS 
filters the target, checking for target 
duplication. AFATDS routes the Call for 
Fire to a Fires Coordinator based on target 
location and other properties.     
 4.  Upon receipt of the target number 
from AFATDS, the IOS client and IOS 
update the target.   
5. The Fires Coordinator checks the target 
location against known friendly locations 
and other parameters.  The Fires Coordinator 
AFATDS system approves or denies the Call 
for Fire.   
 
 6.  AFATDS determines which unit can 
range the target, has the appropriate 
ammunition, and is available for missions. 
AFATDS sends the mission to that Firing 
Unit.  AFATDS sends a “message to 
observer” to the IOS Client and IOS 
telling the Observer what to expect from 
which Firing Unit.     
7.  The Observer acknowledges receipt of 
the message to observer.     
 
 8.  The IOS updates the target with the 
AFATDS-assigned target number.   
9.  The Firing Unit acknowledges receipt of 
the mission.   
 
 10.  The Firing Unit AFATDS processes 
the Fire Mission by conducting technical 
Fire Direction and sending the appropriate 
commands to the gunline. 
11.  The observer observes the effects on the 
target and ends the mission.  The observer 
sends a message containing tactical 
intelligence about the effects on the target to 
AFATDS and IOS.  
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 12.  AFATDS sends an End of Mission 
message to the Fires Coordinator and the 
Firing Unit.  AFATDS saves the tactical 
intelligence from the mission and updates 
its databases.  AFATDS updates the 
Firing Unit information by decrementing 
the amount of ordnance expended from 
the Firing Unit.   
 13.  IOS updates the target as “fired” in its 
COP.   
ALTERNATE Courses: 
Step 3:  This step can be done automatically or manually.  Current USMC practice is to 
have a “man in the loop,” so this check is shown as an Actor action, with communication 
via the AFATDS system.    
Step 4:  If the Mission is Denied, AFATDS sends a Message to observer stating that, and 
saves the target for later processing or analysis. 
Step 11:  The Observer can choose to adjust the fall of shot based on demonstrated lack 
of effect on the target, or can repeat the mission if more effects are needed.  In these 
cases, processing continues at step 5.   
Table 18.   IOS Client Call for Fire Use Case 
 
In general, mission processing with the IOS Client is very similar to that of 
processing as if the client was a regular observer.  The addition is in the multi-cast 
capability from the client and AFATDS (in the FSCCRole) to the IOS server, which 
maintains the updated COP.  Multicast is a simple switch from unicast mode, but requires 
human oversight to set up the dependencies between AFATDS and IOS.  The IOS is 
responsible for identifying the Target state (suspect to active to shot to end of mission) 
and correlating the target with the relevant IOS client and AFATDS messages.  The 
simple solution of using the target number, assigned by AFATDS, keeps this important 
responsibility with AFATDS and requires few changes.  The following Figure shows the 
implementation of this Use Case in terms of a UML Sequence Diagram.  For the IOS, the 
COP contains the target; therefore the messages indicate processing between the 
incoming messages and the COP.  Finally, do not read too much into the timing aspects 
of the apparent parallel processing between the AFATDS nodes and the IOS.  Although 
the processing is time-constrained, the timing is likely to be in terms of seconds rather 
than milliseconds.  For example, the “End of Mission” message from the IOS Client may 
reach both systems at once but take longer to work through the AFATDS network 
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because it needs to reach three more nodes.   This transmission time will produce some 

































Figure 23.   IOS Client Call For Fire Sequence Diagram. 
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Comparing Figure 23 above to Figure 22 (The AFATDS-only Networked Call for 
Fire), the Federation is now inside the system boundary, as they are acting as one entity, 
and should so appear to the end user.  The second item of note is the addition of the COP, 
which is the point of keeping the IOS informed of the mission.  The IOS has the 
responsibility for the COP.  How the AFATDS links to the IOS for other COP updates 
must be developed.  Third, note that only the AFATDS FSCC role has any additional 
duties, and those duties are to add one address (the IOS server) to its mission broadcast 
tables.   
 
D. THE CRITICAL INTEGRATION CHALLENGE 
We return again to the LISI-IMM attributes of PAID.  There are few problems 
surmounting issues with Procedures because the procedures underlying both systems are 
the common Marine Corps tactical processes.  The Applications are what we’re trying to 
integrate, but that becomes easier as the Infrastructure evolves to the DII COE standard 
and common communications (such as the Common Message Parser) for both systems.  
Instead, the critical issue preventing interoperability is the Data.  This section discusses 
specific issues with the data representations that must be fixed.   
 
1. The AFATDS MUL 
AFATDS friendly units are limited to what is in the Master Unit List (MUL).  
Although there can be up to 32766 friendly units, the name of the unit must agree in the 
MUL across the entire AFATDS network, or else the MUL must be changed to reflect the 
new friendly unit structure.  The MUL includes observers, limiting them as well. The 
primary reason for using the MUL was to set up the AFATDS database prior to execution 
to simplify networking parameter entry for the operators.  Since AFATDS can use the 
MUL to figure out what communications protocol a node uses, it doesn’t need the 
operator to set that up.  The decision to use the MUL has resulted in a non-scalable and 
brittle AFATDS network.   
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 2. Friendly Firing Unit Versus Track 
The AFATDS friendly firing unit is modeled with a rich data structure in order to 
accurately monitor and plan fires.  Because of its history, the IOS stores information 
about a unit as a unit track, which does not contain the same amount of data.  The 
operator who creates a friendly unit on an IOS Client must create the same unit in 
AFATDS, or import the unit from IOS into AFATDS and add the extra data in AFATDS.  
This leads to dangerous, possibly erroneous duplication and wasted time.   This 
workaround quickly breaks down for any non-trivial situation with numerous units.   
  
3. Unit Identification 
There is no common naming standard for track objects and AFATDS units.  
Therefore, the IOS designers have decided to use the Unit Short Name as the Key field 
between units.  This generates confusion, and every unit has its own Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) for short names.  For instance, 5th Battalion 10th Marines (an artillery 
unit) might be labeled as 5/10.  But it could also be 5-10 or 5BN10THMAR.  When such 
a unit hits the IOS/AFATDS interface, an operator must resolve the various differences.  
There are a certain percentage of tracks that will get by an operator, contributing to COP 
degradation.   
 
4. COP Object Translation 
In AFATDS, the Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM’s) are called 
geometries.  They are expressed as a collection of up to 30 grid locations and then several 
other identifying features.  The corresponding data in IOS is a polyline in an overlay.  
The AFATDS designers made a design decision to limit FSCM geometries to thirty 
locations or less.  They made this decision because the current message set will only 
support transmission of that number of points.  This limitation is not present in the IOS 
polyline.  In higher level COC’s, such as at the Division or MEF, FSCM’s often have at 
least one hundred grid locations.  Therefore, AFATDS FSCM’s don’t scale in the larger 
COC’s.  Further, AFATDS checks these boundaries during mission processing, so a lack 
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of accuracy translates directly to possible fratricide and the inability to hit certain areas 
without manual intervention.  When FSCM’s are translated, an operator is again required 
to interpret its coordinates on a map. 
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VII.  CURRENT INITIATIVES 
The Marine Corps is aware of the issues surrounding the interoperability 
challenge.  There are several initiatives currently in process that attempt to ameliorate the 
interoperability problems.  This chapter lists some of those initiatives and how they will 
help. 
 
A. FIRE SUPPORT CLIENT 
The Fire Support Client is middleware written by Raytheon that allows an IOS 
Client (such as C2PC) to enter fires data on the Client and send that data to the AFATDS 
network.  Specifically, the client enables the C2PC user to: 
• Create and Delete AFATDS Geometries such as Fire Support Coordination Measures 
• Receive, filter, and display AFATDS information 
• Receive reports on unit status as stored in the AFATDS network 
• Creation of targeting lists for processing by AFATDS and reports from AFATDS 
target lists  
• Update unit locations in AFATDS database 
• Call for Fire to the AFATDS network as if the Client was a traditional AFATDS 
observer  [FSCA01] 
The Fire Support client is effective in extending the AFATDS network to those 
organizations that do not have a dedicated AFATDS box.  Yet the Fire Support Client 
doesn’t solve the interoperability issue because no data in the Client interacts with the 
IOS data and COP.  The user of the IOS client can overlay AFATDS data on his screen, 
but has no automated way of resolving differences between the objects represented.  As 
an example, imagine a unit represented in each system.  If there is a 100-meter grid 
difference in their locations, and the C2PC operator overlays the AFATDS data on the 
IOS picture.  Then the C2PC operator will see two symbols on his screen.  A more 
dangerous example is if the grids are not close – then the operator is not sure where the 
unit is actually located, and the difference may be operationally significant.    
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B. PROXY SERVER  
The proxy server is middleware.  The AFATDS project main sponsor is the 
Army.  The Army required AFATDS version A99 to migrate to version 4.x data 
structures in 2000.    The GCCS-M interface, known to the Army as the JMCIS interface 
(which is the same interface that TCO uses, which runs on an IOS box) used UB version 
3.x. The GCCS 4.x and UB v 3.x are incompatible, so Raytheon wrote a proxy server that 
would reside on JMCIS/GCCS-M/TCO/IOS boxes (as a segment on the Version 3.x UB) 
that would translate v4.x data into v3.x data.  The proxy came in because the segment 
riding on the UB v3.x used the old API’s.  [APRX00]  This is an example of middleware 
being used to fix a versioning issue.   
The proxy server is effective in translating those items that can be translated 
between IOS and AFATDS.  A system operator is still required to enrich the data model 
where the data does not exist and ensure that short titles of the units are properly 
translated between the systems.  Finally, as GCCS transitions to version 4.x, the proxy 
server should be replaced by the communications methods common to the infrastructure 
underlying both systems.  
 
C. TESTING 
The Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA is the west-coast 
part of SYSCOM) has the charter to conduct functional (or “black box”) testing of 
recently released software for compatibility.   They have built a facility that has all 
currently fielded Command and Control hardware and software, connected by fielded 
tactical communications devices.  In addition, they have some ability to inject software 
faults and hardware failures into testing to evaluate the results.  MCTSSA refers to their 
test suite as “The Node.”    
I observed the MCTSSA test of the AFATDS/IOS connection in response to a 
Safety-of Use Message sent from the I MEF current fires officer in January 2002. The 
message alleged several critical safety deficiencies in the interface that could result in 
fratricide. [1MEF02] The AFATDS project officer recommended not using the 
AFATDS/IOS interface until testing could be completed at MCTSSA.  The interface was 
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tested in late February 2002 and was indeed found to be inoperable.  Specifically, no 
COP objects could be shared between the AFATDS and IOS Networks (both networks 
still worked internally) despite the proxy server.  Knowing this information, the AFATDS 
project officer directed that the new software versions of both systems be tested against 
each other.  These versions did interoperate at the previous level (LISI-IMM  level 2), 
and the MARCORSYSCOM made the logical decision to rapidly issue the new software 
to the Fleet Marine Forces.    
What is interesting is that neither MCTSSA nor MARCORSYSCOM knew that 
the software interface didn’t work until the FMF reported it.  From a MCTSSA 
perspective, there are thirty-plus C2 programs out there, and each one changes versions 
on its own schedule, usually annually – therefore the testing problem is intractable.  From 
the FMF perspective, MCTSSA and MARCORSYSCOM appear to be reactive vice 
proactive.   
MCTSSA (Systems Engineering and Integration Branch) does have one really 
outstanding testing project called the MAGTF C4SIR Integrated Program (MIP).  The 
MIP is attempting to baseline8 all the C2 systems in the Corps and test them in a 
federation rather than individually.  Testing is done using an “end-to-end” concept, 
sending messages in a tactical environment and determining total transmission time.  This 
method is effective because it highlights federation failures rather than individual system 
failures.  For instance, the MIP program may measure the amount of time it takes to send 
a Call for Fire from an observer to the Firing battery. Perhaps the AFATDS program has 
promised processing times in terms of milliseconds, but the end-to-end test indicates a 
time approaching two minutes – then the MCTSSA engineers can troubleshoot the delay.  
The fact that the MIP is baselined allows for scientific analysis.  MARCORSYSCOM is 
suspicious of the MIP program because the baseline constrains Project Officers from 
releasing products whenever their individual programs are ready.   The Fleet may not 
accept baselining because individual communities may feel they don’t have “the latest 
software.”    
                                                 
8 Baselining means that individual systems are under version control, and software system versions are 
not issued to the fleet without being tested and put into the new baseline, which would coordinate Corps-
wide release of all software in the new baseline.   
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 D. FLEET SUPPORT CONTRACTORS 
Each company that provides a C2 system also has fleet support contractors on the 
payroll that work at the major commands such as the MEF’s.  These contractors serve as 
liaisons between the manufacturers and the units, report bugs, implement fixes, and act as 
“go to guys” for their systems.  The fleet support contractors are experts in their systems, 
and they become expert in the needs of the fleet.  They serve as advocates for improved 
systems and can better articulate requirements.  
However, there are issues with civilians in a military organization.  First, the C2 
systems have requirements for ease of use, and in fact, these requirements are the ones 
that are properly written in the ORD’s.  Needing a contractor means the system did not 
meet usability requirements.  Second, every contractor that must be hauled to a battlefield 
takes the place of a combat-ready Marine. Third, there are obvious safety and liability 
issues with civilians on the battlefield.  Fourth, the contractor works for the company that 
makes the C2 system.  He just happens to be posted with the Marine Corps.  Of course 
they will support the Corps, but their viewpoint is that of their system, rather than 
federation interoperability.     
 
E. VERSION CONTROL 
The SE&I branch of MARCORSYSCOM is attempting software version control.  
They have made several efforts at coordinated version control between the contractors, 
and tied this effort into the MIP baseline effort at MCTSSA. The current system is called 
“C4I for the Warrior” (C4IFTW) and is supported by a password-protected database 
called MSTAR.  MSTAR stands for the MAGTF Systems/Technical Architecture and 
Repository.  [MSTR02]  The MSTAR’s mission is to:   
…provide a MAGTF C4ISR system-of-systems that is controlled, secure 
and interoperable in the Joint Environment, from the battle field to the 
sustaining base. MSTAR is a suite of web accessible products that provide 
Marine Corps acquisition professionals information they require to ensure 
systems interoperability. [MSTR02] 
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MSTAR should contain all the I-KPP’s for each MARCORSYSCOM project, 
along with the development and deployment data for each system. However the database 
is empty when queried for AFATDS (both version A98 and A99), and calls and emails to 
the listed points of contact were not returned.  Therefore it is impossible for me to 
determine if this method of data collection and coordination is working or a failure.    
But even if SE&I branch had a perfect tracking mechanism for every C2 project 
in the Corps, the acquisition culture rewards project officers that meet cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints.  They are not rewarded for spending time with SE&I division 
talking about interoperability.  Because project officers are pulled from the fleet (as was 
the case with the last two AFATDS project officers) there is no institutional memory, and 
each officer focuses first on the budget.  The senior leader in the ground C4 project office 
has control of 11 different C2 programs but no interoperability tasking.  He has never 
been provided the specific role of software integrator, and doesn’t have the training or the 
expertise to coordinate version control between all the various systems.  The bottom line 





























The AFATDS/IOS interface is at LISI-IMM level 2, which permits limited 
interoperability with significant user intervention for data conversion between the 
systems.  The current initiatives to apply third party middleware to solve the problem are 
only partially successful.  Further, the middleware solutions are only effective until either 
software version changes, which occurs annually at a minimum, although through luck a 
middleware solution may make it through a version change. The goal of a truly 
interoperable system is to reach LISI-IMM interoperability level 4.  In order to reach this 
goal, the AFATDS/IOS interface must overcome the hurdle of different data models.  
The major hinderances to reaching interoperability level 4 are organizational and political 
rather than technical.  
Even a cursory search of the relevant literature reveals that technical solutions to 
interoperability abound.  A good interoperability solution will be open source, shared 
across many domains, and focus on integrating the system-of-systems data models.  
Possible technical solutions include ideas like Captain Young’s Federation of 
Independent Objects interoperability Model (FIOM), the use of Extensible Markup 
Language (XML), or similar languages and structures that support information sharing.  
No one of these technologies completely solve the interoperability problem, but they do 
provide a good foundation for further work.  The challenge of moving an adequate 
number of bits through the air is being met, and the protocols necessary for low-level 
communication between systems is no longer a challenge.  Now it is time to focus on the 
data.   
No matter what solution or combination of solutions, each will require the 
expenditure of significant sums of money and time.  Solving interoperability issues will 
also require expertise and a degree of cooperation from every DoD agency heretofore 
unseen.  Yet, the need is pressing.  Every officer will run up against an interoperability 
challenge sometime in his or her career.  Tactical interoperability problems increase the 
potential for casualties.   Rejecting automated Command and Control systems or ignoring 
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them in the hopes they will go away is a futile strategy.  Instead, there are specific small 
steps that can be taken by each level of the hierarchy to solve interoperability issues.  
They are listed below.  
 
B. JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The JROC must force interoperability.  They have been given the authority, and 
have been tasked with the responsibility for integration.  They must not settle for service 
appeasement.  In order to integrate, the JROC must rely on Subject Matter Experts.  
DISA has the expertise.  DISA already has a dedicated and influential role, but the 
services must follow DISA guidelines in order to solve interoperability problems.  
Services are reluctant to do this not only because of service parochialism, but because 
they bear the pain of cost overruns and schedule delays associated with changing 
requirements.   Yet without JROC control, the question of “who’s in charge” will 
continue to paralyze the joint world.   
The DoD must agree on a joint standard for naming objects in the tactical 
environment.  The most basic subset of this problem is to agree on a Unit Reference 
Number (URN) standard.  The URN would be the key, unchanging attribute allowing 
conversion of real-world units between the battlespace and the various systems.  
Currently, service parochialism is preventing the DoD from agreeing on a URN standard.      
 
C. MARINE CORPS RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. System Architecture Management 
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The Marine Corps suffers because of a lack of an overall systems architecture that 
supports the operational architecture.  It further suffers because the organizations tasked 
with making that architecture do not have the power necessary to make it a reality.   In 
accordance with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, the Marine Corps appointed a Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), tasked by statute with managing all enterprise-wide 
Information Technology systems.  From the title and responsibilities assigned, one would 
think that architecture would be the CIO’s bread and butter, and in fact the CIO has had 
extensive involvement in IT decisions on the non-tactical side (this includes the Navy-
Marine Corps Intranet effort).  But for political and other reasons, the same has not 
happened in the tactical arena.   
The CIO must take charge and assume responsibility for the tactical Systems 
Architecture effort.  A good delineation of effort would be achieved if the CIO dictated 
the Systems Architecture in accordance with the Operational Architecture generated out 
of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.  Then the Marine Corps Systems 
Command could buy or build systems to the Systems Architecture, using the already 
established and accepted Joint Technical Architecture.   
The Marine Corps needs to articulate its concerns with the Unit Reference 
Number (URN), and then submit to a joint decision and implement that decision Corps-
wide.  The choice of a number to represent units should take less than a year.  Any more 
time indicates political inertia is hurting interoperability.      
 
2. MARCORSYSCOM 
Until the CIO assumes responsibility for Systems Architecture, SE&I Branch, 
MARCORSYSCOM, must be given the authority to halt and re-engineer any given 
program to meet interoperability requirements.  There is no doubt that requiring Project 
Officers to meet interoperability requirements is culturally painful and institutionally 
costly, but the Marine Corps must make its procurement people face this pain rather than 
fielding non-interoperable systems, where the FMF suffers.  This is not happening, as 
indicated by the lack of usable data in the MSTAR database, the current SE&I effort to 
this end.   
The IOS program should use formal program management methods and have its 
own funding line in accordance with DoD Acquisition regulations.  This will allow better 
management of the software and creation of other artifacts, and most importantly, 
accurately articulate and document user requirements.  Since IOS is a “son of GCCS”, the 
IOS program has the larger task of ensuring USMC requirements are met in the parent 
software.  The IOS program manager and engineers should not be software writers but 
requirements articulators.   
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The AFATDS project office must continue to fund short-term solutions that 
enable LISI-IMM level 2 interoperability.  This includes both the Fire Support Client and 
the Proxy Server.  Decision-makers must be made aware that these software programs 
must have continuing funding and support, because they will require modification at 
roughly twice the rate of the supported programs.  Interface testing will also require 
funding at current rates, which supports an AFATDS project officer at MCTSSA.  
    
3. Fleet Contractors 
 Because current and legacy systems are not user friendly and do not interoperate, 
contractors (or TechReps) in the FMF are required for the foreseeable future.  However, 
the FMF should stop hiring program contractors and should start hiring “Interoperability 
Engineers.”  These interoperability engineers, hired from consulting firms or from other 
sources, would work for the FMF, rather than for any particular system, and be evaluated 
on their ability to achieve systems interoperability.  The Interoperability Engineer skillset 
could be met with a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or a related field, and must 
include the ability to accurately articulate and document user requirements.   
 
4. MCTSSA 
The Marine Corps (possibly MCTSSA) should implement a collaborative website 
for users, administrators, and developers to share information.  It should be unclassified 
but password protected.  Keeping the website on classified networks impedes people’s 
ability to use the information.  One outstanding website model is SPAWAR Charleston’s 
TACMobile website for ground C2 systems.   There is unlimited shelf space for training 
materials and user’s manuals.  Chat and other collaborative tools are built in.  Such a 
website would require at least one moderator, but would bear great dividends in increased 
information sharing between users and developers. MCTSSA already maintains a 24 hour 
voice helpdesk and a classified website, which is a start.   
MCTSSA’s end-to-end testing (the MIP) must continue.  The MIP process should 
set baselines and formally report to the CIO at least annually.  If there is a political issue 
with MCTSSA being under MARCORSYSCOM and not under the USMC CIO, then the 
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MIP process should have the appropriate blessing by the appropriate Marines to become 
a CIO-directed effort.  End-to-end testing is the only way to accurately assess and 
quantify the warfighter’s complaints.  Accurate problem descriptions will lead to better 
solutions.     
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NPS 
The Naval Postgraduate School is the Navy and Marine Corps’ corporate 
institution for graduate technical education.  This year alone, some 20 Marines are 
graduating from the ITM curriculum.  Upon departing NPS, every Information 
Technology and Software Engineering officer will be expected to do their part in solving 
the myriad interoperability problems in the fleet.  Yet the NPS curriculum has no course 
that discusses interoperability issues or interoperability solutions in any depth.  Such a 
course should be developed.  For Software Engineering students, an interoperability 
course should be required.  Possible topics for an interoperability course include: 
• Problems with Software integration in DoD  
• System-of-System modeling and Federations 
• LISI-IMM and other methods of evaluating current interoperability issues 
• Generating Interoperability Requirements 
• Shared Data Environments 
• Evaluating Middleware and Glue and Wrapper Software 
• Data conversion using XML and XSLT 
• The Promise and Pitfalls of Object Orientation in integration efforts 
The ultimate goal of the course would be to prepare students to evaluate third 
party vendor solutions to interoperability challenges, since a common technique for 
interoperability is to buy middleware or convert data from one system to another.  
Another distressingly common technique is to generate manual workarounds or ignore 
the problem.  Graduates having the knowledge from a course similar to this would be 
much better equipped to handle the inevitable interoperability challenges that they will 
face.   
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E. THE UML AS A MODELING TOOL 
Important modeling considerations are the amount of coverage of the model (its 
scope), and the accuracy with which the model represents reality (its fidelity).   A critical 
element of a modeling language is the ability to accurately and unambiguously convey 
the meaning in the model.  The UML is associated with object oriented analysis and 
design, and meets these critical elements for object oriented models and eases 
development of the corresponding systems.   
The UML was used in this thesis to model two systems in the C2 domain that 
were not originally designed or implemented using object orientation.  Model scope was 
limited because of domain complexity.  Fidelity was limited for the same reason.  
However, it is clear that the Use Cases and resulting UML were easy to learn, accurately 
reflected the concepts in the Use Cases, and effectively conveyed the meaning of the 
systems.  Further, the graphical features of UML led to better understanding of the 
systems and interoperability challenges, and pointed to the complexities of system 
integration.  Although timing and other constraints were not modeled, the UML (and 
other associated modeling tools such as the Object Constraint Language) has sufficient 
depth to model these factors.     
Finally, object orientation appears to be an appropriate paradigm for C2 systems 
development.  Most battlefield items have attributes and methods that can map directly to 
software.  Thinking about the battlefield in this way may help warfighters better converse 
with system developers to describe their requirements.  Using a common visual language 
such as UML can only help.   
     
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
AFATDS and IOS need to share data, and the main sticking point is a shared data 
model.  Research could be directed at establishing that shared data model from 
conceptual and business case rules.  Midterm solutions could focus on development or 
selection of appropriate middleware products.  Another midterm solution that warrants 
further research is the use of XML and XSLT to develop middleware that automatically 
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converts data from one system to another.  A concrete topic would be to apply Captain 
Young’s FIOM (which uses XML) to the data models in the AFATDS/IOS interface.   
Research could be conducted into what Commanders actually want.  This could 
involve prototyping several different COP models and see which is most popular for a 
given domain.  Research should be conducted into future C2 systems.  The Marine Corps 
Warfighting lab, in conjunction with the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at 
the California Polytechnic Institute, is developing a shared Command and Control Data 
Environment.  The system using this data environment is called the Integrated Marine 
Multi-Agent Command and Control System (IMMACCS).  [POHL01]  Although this 
initiative is only service-wide (meaning deployment would create a one-service 
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APPENDIX A.  GLOSSARY 
Term Definition Reference 
ADLER A German Artillery C2 system.  The acronym stands 
for “The Artillery Data Situation and Deployment 
Computer Network.” 
 
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System  
API Application Program Interface.  A standardized way 
for programmers to call the functions of a given piece 
of software without needing to know the details of the 
software code.    
 
Artifact “A piece of information that is used or produced by a 
software development process.”  Examples of artifacts 
include source code, help manuals, and written or 
electronic documentation.   
[BOOC97] 
BATES A British Artillery C2 system.  The acronym stands for 
“The Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System.” 
 
bps  Bits per second.  A measure of the digital capacity of a 
communications channel.   
 
C2 Command and Control  [JPUB01] 
C4I Command, Control, Communications and Computers, 
and Intelligence 
 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
 
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements  
CMP Common Message Processor  
COP Common Operational Picture:  “A single identical 
display of relevant information shared by more than 
one command.”  A common operational picture 
facilitates collaborative planning and assists all 
echelons to achieve situational awareness.  
[JPUB01] 
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf.  Refers to commercial 
(unmodified) software bought for government use.   
 
CROP Common Relevant Operational Picture: A term 
representing a portion of the COP, relevant to a given 
echelon or situation.   
 
CTP Common Tactical Picture: A term representing a 
portion of the COP, relevant to a given echelon or 
situation.     
 
DACT Digital Automated Communications Terminal.  This 
digital device is one of several used by forward 
observers (FO’s) to call for fire.  
 
DII-COE Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating 
Environment. 
 
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency  
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EPLRS Enhanced Position-Location Reporting System  
FA CP Field Artillery CP. An Army term equivalent to the 
USMC’s Fire Direction Center (FDC).   
 
FDC Fire Direction Center.  A generic term representing the 
C2 node where technical fire direction computations 
occur (in units with indirect fire platforms.)  In higher 
headquarters, the FDC’s are responsible for a mix of 
technical and tactical fire direction.  
 
FMF Fleet Marine Forces.  This term refers to Marine 
combat organizations in a general sense, independent 
of task organization for specific missions.   
 
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center.  The FSCC is a C2 
node responsible for conducting tactical fire direction, 
fire planning, and clearance of fires (a safety function).  
Typically, FSCC’s are part of supported infantry units.  
 
FSCM Fire Support Coordinating Measure.  “A measure 
employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid 
engagement of targets and simultaneously provide 
safeguards for friendly forces.” 
FSCM’s are drawn on maps and contain instructions 
about what is permitted or denied in an area.  An 
example FSCM is the No Fire Area (NFA).    
[JPUB01] 
FSE Fire Support Element.  An Army term equivalent to the 
USMC’s Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). 
 
GCCS Global Command and Control System  
GOTS Government Off the Shelf.  A term referring to 
software developed under governmental auspices but 
made available to others for use. 
 
IAS Intelligence Analysis System  
IER Information Exchange Requirement:  The requirement 
for information to be passed between and among 
forces, organizations, or administrative structures 
concerning ongoing activities. Information Exchange 
Requirements identify who exchanges what 
information with whom, as well as, why the 
information is necessary and how that information will 
be used. 
[SNIN01] 
Integration The act or process of making into a whole by bringing 
all the parts together.  To join with something else; 
unite.     
[AMHD85] 
Interoperability 1. The ability of two or more systems or components to 
exchange information and to use the information that 
has been exchanged. 
2. The condition achieved among communications-
electronics systems or items of communications-
electronics equipment when information or services 
can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between 
them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability 






IOS Intelligence-Operations Server  
IUC Independent User Center.  In the AFATDS domain, an 
IUC is a standalone AFATDS workstation with a 
subset of the capabilities of an OPFAC.   
 
JMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System  
JOPES Joint Operations Planning System.  This acronym 
describes a process the output of which is Operations 
Plans and deployment information. 
 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
JTA Joint Technical Architecture  
JVMF Joint Variable Message Format  
MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command.  This command is 
responsible for development and acquisition of all 
Marine Corps materiel, to include software.  Also 
referred to as SYSCOM.   
 
MCTSSA Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity  
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade.  This combined arms 
force is built around an infantry regiment ground 
combat element, a composite air group as the air 
combat element, and a brigade service support group as 
the service support element.  It is larger than a MEU 
but smaller than a MEF. 
 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force.  This largest of the 
Marine’s combined arms forces has a division as the 
ground combat element, an air wing as the air combat 
element, and a force service support group as the 
service support element.  It is commanded by a 
Lieutenant General. 
 
MET Meteorological Information  
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit.  This combined arms force 
has a battalion landing team as the ground combat 
element, a composite squadron as the air combat 
element, and a MEU service support group as the 
service support element.  It is the smallest sustainable 
combined arms force.    
 
MIDB Modernized Integrated Database.  This database stores 
intelligence information.   
 
MUL Master Unit List.  In the AFATDS system, the MUL is 
a listing of all friendly units that can be joined in an 
AFATDS network.   
 
OODA Observe-Orient-Decide-Act  
OPLAN Operations Plan.  A collection of documents, maps, 
and other items that outline the conduct of a particular 
course of action.  It may or may not have any relevance 
to any particular world situation.    
 
ORD Operational Requirements Document.  In acquisition, a 
program must have an ORD before it can become a 
Program of Record.   
 
127 
PLI Position-Location Information  
PLRS Position-Location Reporting System  
Program of Record Generically used to represent a development or 
Acquisition program under the DoD 5000 Acquisition 
model.  Generally, a Program of Record is one that has 
a validated Mission Needs Statement and appropriated 
funding.  
 
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.  This 
command is responsible for development and 
acquisition of C2 systems for the U.S. Navy and when 
tasked, for the U.S. Marine Corps.   
 
SYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command.  This command is 
responsible for development and acquisition of all 
Marine Corps materiel, to include software.   
 
Systems Architecture Design.  The way components fit together.   [IEEE90] 
TCO Tactical Combat Operations  
TDBM Track Database Manager  
TPFDD Time-Phased Force Deployment Data.  A set of 
documents that describe how forces and equipment 
will get from one place to another in response to 
military need.   
 
Track A track is a single entity reported on the COP such as 
an aircraft, ship, TBM or emitter location.  A track can 
also designate an aggregation of military personnel, 
weapon systems, vehicles, and support elements or any 
other operationally significant item. 
[JCOP02A] 
UB Unified Build.  This DISA term represents the common 
DISA managed software components in a Global 
Command and Control (GCCS) suite.    
 
UCP Unified Campaign Plan  
View In UML:  A projection into a model, which is seen 
from a given perspective or vantage point and omits 
entities that are not relevant to this perspective.   
[BOOC99, 468] 
XML Extensible Markup Language.  This meta-language 
stores the definition and presentation characteristics of 
data.  By storing this data about data, system 
developers can specify and manipulate complex data 
models.     
 
XSLT Extensible Style Language Transformation.  This 
language specifies the transformation of data from one 





APPENDIX B.  EXAMPLE MARINE ORGANIZATION FOR 
COMBAT 
Often, Marine artillery Battalion will be in Direct Support of an Infantry 
Regiment.  The term “Direct Support” means that the artillery Battalion sends liaison 
teams to the Infantry Regiment, and priority for artillery fires goes toward Regimental 
Needs.  The artillery Battalion provides Forward Observer teams to the supported 
infantry Regiment, and answers calls for fire from its own observers first.  Figure 24 
below shows this typical organization. 
 
Figure 24.   Marine Artillery Battalion in Direct Support of an Infantry Regiment 
 
The Liaison team that attaches to the Regimental headquarters is led by an 
artillery Captain or Major.  Together with his staff and others from the Regiment, he 
forms the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC).  The FSCC is responsible for 
planning and executing all fires in the Regimental zone of action, or battlespace.   The 
Artillery Battalion Liaison cell travels with sufficient AFATDS terminals to support the 
Regimental Combat Operations Center (COC).   
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Each of the three Artillery batteries supplies 3 forward observer teams and a 
Liaison team to an Infantry Battalion.  In the case of the infantry battalions, the battery 
liaison officer joins the Battalion FSCC, which is headed by an infantry officer, usually 
the Infantry Battalion Weapons Company Commander.  The artillery Liaison Officers 
bring sufficient AFATDS terminals to support the Infantry Battalion COC’s.  Meanwhile, 
the forward observers (a 2nd or 1st Lieutenant along with several other Marines) each join 
a company and provide fire support expertise as well as radio communications sufficient 
to communicate with the Artillery Regiment.   The forward observers bring sufficient 
digital equipment to support communications with the AFATDS terminals at the infantry 
battalion FSCC’s.   
One typical Digitized Regimental COC is diagrammed in Figure 25.  This COC 
was designed by the 6th Marines Regimental Commander, Col Coleman and his staff.  It 
was used for the 6th Marines Combined Arms Exercise in 29 Palms, Ca., in February and 
March 2002.  The artillery battalion supporting 6th Marines was 2nd Battalion, 10th 
Marines.  Although this diagram shows one AFATDS terminal attached to the COC, the 
Artillery Battalion typically brings at least two terminals.   The second terminal is used 
for planning.  Also note the IOS (v. 1) Server located in the entrance to the main tent, and 
the Command and Control PC (C2PC) computers, which are IOS client stations.  Finally, 
all the systems were networked via Ethernet.  Networking is necessary but not sufficient 
for interoperability.   
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Figure 25.   Example Regimental COC. (After [LITT02]) 
 The Infantry Battalion COC is a smaller version of the Regimental COC.  
Typically, the Battalion COC does not have the large display screens or more than 3 
C2PC terminals, and does not have an IOS server.  The infantry Battalions also do not 
have the tentage to support a large COC, and generally run a COC out of the back of 
HUMMWV’s or in one or two AAVC7’s (Assault Amphibious Vehicle – C2 variant).  
The infantry battalion does have 2 AFATDS systems, brought by the Artillery Liaison 
Officer when he is attached.   
The Artillery Battalion “COC” is named the Fire Direction Center (FDC), and 
contains 3 AFATDS systems.  The Battalion FDC serves as the clearinghouse for fire 
missions from the Observers attached to the Regiment.  The Battalion FDC then tasks fire 
missions to the Artillery Batteries.  The artillery Batteries have two AFATDS terminals, 
with one terminal providing technical fire direction.   
Digital connectivity between the Regiment and the four Battalions (this includes 
the Artillery Battalion) is maintained by either an EPLRS network or SINCGARS radio 
network.  SINCGARS will support up to a 10 kbps connection, while EPLRS will 
support up to 57 kbps, with an upgrade to 276 kbps expected by the end of 2002.   
  Although AFATDS and IOS both use the same IP-based wireless 
communications protocol and can be routed and multiplexed, the 6th Marines 
communications officer had to separate AFATDS traffic from IOS traffic onto different 
networks due to unspecified incompatibilities.  IOS traffic carried the Regimental COP, 
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